莫迪会将印度带向何方？

Modi and his challenges: Leading India on its march to prosperity
莫迪和他的挑战：引领印度走向繁荣之路

​Despite Narendra Modi’s successful leadership as chief minister of Gujarat, some question his ability to achieve the same progress at the national level as India’s prime minister. This column analyses Modi’s political background and state- and national-level experience to assess his capacity to navigate India through a politically and economically important time towards its goal of becoming a prosperous economy. It finds that while Modi can lean on his Gujarati experience to some extent, in other aspects he will have to depart from his incremental approach to policymaking in favour of radical changes, particularly in the area of employment maximisation.

虽然纳伦德拉·莫迪在担任古吉拉特邦首席部长期间有过毋庸置疑的成功，仍有人怀疑他是否有能力在印度总理的位置上领导这个国家获取同样的成就。本期专栏将分析莫迪的政治背景以及他在印度的邦和国家级别的从政经历，以此来评估他是否有能力在此关键的政治经济时期内带领这个国家航向成为一个繁荣经济体的伟大目标。文章的结论是，虽然莫迪能够在一定程度上依靠他在古吉拉特邦的成功领导经历，他仍然需要在其它一些方面——尤其是在促进充分就业上——背离他之前在政策制定上一直采取的渐进方式，而偏向一些更为激进的变革措施。

Mr Narendra Modi has attracted world-wide attention both prior to and after becoming India’s prime minister in May 2014. From having been denied a visa to the US while he was the chief minister of Gujarat, he is the only Indian prime minister to have visited the White House twice in two years. He has brought India closer to securing a position on the high table of global governance by forging stronger relations with the majority of G7 members (Wignaraja 2012), and has also focused sharply on a robust development agenda at home. At the same time, his critics continue to snipe at him for not adopting a more strident secular agenda, suggesting he has thereby covertly encouraged right-wing Hindu nationalists.

纳伦德拉·莫迪先生在2014年5月成为印度总理前后都曾获得全世界的广泛关注。他曾经作为古吉拉特邦的首席部长被美国拒签，但他也是首位在两年内两度访问白宫的印度总理。通过与七国集团（G7）中的多数国家建立更紧密的联系，他让印度更接近在全球治理的最高谈判桌上获取一席之地的目标。而在印度国内，他敏锐地将注意力集中在一个稳健的发展日程表上。与此同时，针对他的尖锐批评也从未停止，批评家们指责他没有采取一个更彻底的世俗化方案，意在暗示莫迪实际上在暗中煽动右翼的印度教民族主义者。

In this context, in a new book I attempt to answer three crucial questions (Kumar 2016). First, I ask whether Modi, with his upbringing within the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (the National Volunteers Organisation, or RSS), represents the hard core Hindu nationalism that is antithetical to India’s pluralistic reality and traditions, or whether he has evolved over time to be in sync with India’s ground level realities. Second, I ask if his much-propagated success is entirely his doing and whether his experience as the chief minister of Gujarat (one of India’s 29 provinces) for 12 years is replicable at the national level. Finally, I ask whether  his two years experience in Delhi since taking over as prime minister in May 2014 confirm his capacity to address the extraordinary challenges faced by India as it traverses its ongoing transition towards a relatively prosperous society that will meet the aspirations of its young population.

在此背景下，我尝试在自己的新书中回答三个关键性的问题。第一，莫迪在印度国民志愿服务团（RSS）的成长经历是否代表着他是站在印度多元主义的现实和传统对立面的印度教民族主义者的中坚力量，还是随着时间的推移他已经能够与印度的基本现实保持一致?第二，他之前所获得的广为人知的成功完全是依靠他自身的作为吗？他在担任古吉拉特邦（印度的29个邦之一）首席部长的12年内的成功经历能够在印度全国范围内被复制吗？最后，自2014年5月担任印度总理的两年来，他在新德里的表现是否证明了他有足够的能力应对印度所面临的那些不同寻常的挑战，带领这个国家走过当前这段重要的转型时期，并成为一个相对繁荣的国家以满足年轻国民们的愿望？

Modi and the RSS
莫迪和国民志愿服务团

Modi joined the RSS initially as a child volunteer and then as a full time worker when he was 17. He has unabashedly admitted to his life-long debt to the organisation for the succour it provided and the opportunities it afforded him, and is undoubtedly the epitome of a RSS worker. His stint as the chief minister of Gujarat, during which he went through an initiation by communal fire within the first four months of having taken office and won three successive elections on the strength of his development record, saw him evolve above his RSS origins. He consciously jettisoned the Hindutva(religion-based) agenda in favour of pursuing a broad based development programme that was delivered without discrimination to all sections of the population.

莫迪最初是作为儿童志愿者加入国民志愿服务团的，之后在他17岁时，他成为了该组织的一名全职工作人员。他曾毫不掩饰地承认该组织对他所提供的帮助和机遇是他一生都无法报答的，而他也毫无疑问地成为了国民志愿服务团工作人员的象征。在古吉拉特邦首席部长任内，莫迪在就职后仅仅四个月内就经历了一场印度教徒和穆斯林间的社群暴乱【译者注：这里指2002年古吉拉特邦发生的印度教徒发动的针对穆斯林的暴乱】，而凭借在经济发展上优秀的表现，他连续三次赢得古吉拉特邦的选举，这些经历都见证了他逐步超越了国民志愿团成员的初始身份。为了追求一个民众基础更为广泛的发展计划，他有意识地拒绝了一个印度教民族主义的方案，而该计划最终也得以在所有民众当中无差别地实施。

It is a safe bet that Modi will neither adopt nor actively encourage a communal agenda to retain his office. Having been subjected to perhaps the most stringent judicial scrutiny faced by any Indian political leader and emerging unscathed from it, having publicly avowed to safeguarding India’s democratic institutions, and having been under the watchful eye of a fiercely competitive and independent public media, Modi cannot afford to pander to or support a communal agenda. He has and will continue to focus relentlessly on the development agenda, and in particular to a more efficient delivery of public services.

可以安全的猜测，莫迪既不会接受也不会积极鼓励一个教派主义议程来保住自己的总理职位。莫迪经历过也许是印度的政治领袖所经历过的最严格的司法审查，他毫发无伤地通过了审查并在之后继续崛起，他还曾公开宣称将保卫印度的民主制度，此外他还长期处于强大的竞争对手和独立公共媒体的注视之下，这些都使得他不可能去迎合或支持一个教派主义的议程。他在过去一直将注意力集中在发展议程上，可以预见他会在未来继续将注意力聚焦于此，特别是在提供更加有效的公共服务方面。

The Gujarat experience
古吉拉特的经历

The Gujarat experience was unarguably a successful one. This is borne out not only by the successive electoral victories, a record in Gujarat’s history, but also by looking at any set of development parameters. According to these, Gujarat’s performance has consistently been among the top 10% of all Indian provinces. However, this stellar performance is not entirely a ‘one man show’ as some of Modi’s acolytes would have us believe. Gujarat was historically one of the more economically advanced states in India, and had a strong tradition of entrepreneurship and cooperative interaction between the public and private sectors. The cooperative movement, to which Gujarat owes a lot for its contribution to both growth and employment, had also been developed over time with the efforts of Lalbhai, Verghese Kurien and others.

莫迪在古吉拉特的经历毫无疑问是成功的。能证明这一点的不仅仅是他在选举中的连续三次胜利——这创造了古吉拉特的历史记录；不论从任何经济发展的指标上看，他的成功都是显而易见的。在莫迪任内，古吉拉特的经济表现一直都位于印度诸邦中的前10%。然而并不像一些其拥趸所希望人们相信的，事实上，如此杰出的表现并不完全是莫迪一人之功。古吉拉特在历史上一直都是印度国内经济最为发达的邦之一，有着根深蒂固的企业家精神以及公私部门紧密合作的传统。古吉拉特的经济和就业增长在很大程度上都要归功于合作社运动，而这一运动已经在Lalbhai，Verghese Kurien和其它一些人的努力之下进行了多年。

Modi built upon these strengths and reversed the decline in governance that had set in during the five years prior to his coming to power. The best example of course was his actively championing the completion of the Sardar Sarovar dam on the Narmada river, which brought life giving waters to the parched lands of Saurashtra and allowed the revival of eight minor river basins including the Sabarmati in Ahmedabad. The project had been more than 30 years in the making, so claims that Modi single-handedly delivered it are gross exaggerations. But the fact remains that without his leadership and commitment the project would not have been completed and the water situation in Gujarat would have turned disastrous in little time.

莫迪以之前人们的这些努力为基础，扭转了在他上任之前五年中政府治理方面的衰退趋势。最好的例子无疑是他积极推动了纳尔马达河上萨尔达·萨罗瓦大坝的完工，这一工程为索拉什特拉地区干旱的土地带来了生命亟需的水源，还让包括艾哈迈达巴德地区的萨巴马迪在内的八个小型河谷恢复了生机。这一工程从开工建造之日起耗时超过30年，因此说它是莫迪一手完成的政绩显然是大大言过其实了。但需要承认的事实是，如果没有莫迪的领导和决心，这项工程到今天都不可能完工，而古吉拉特的水源状况也会在极短时间内经历灾难性的恶化。

Modi’s project execution capabilities and focus on good governance made a critical difference and pushed Gujarat’s growth trajectory to a markedly higher level.

莫迪在项目执行上的能力和对于良好政府治理的关注在其中发挥了非常关键的作用，也将古吉拉特邦的增长轨迹推向了一个引人注目的高度。

However, the successful Gujarat experience is only partially replicable at the national level in India. The extreme centralisation of administration in the chief minister’s office in Gujarat, which was at the core of improved governance, cannot possibly be replicated in the complex and ultra-pluralist canvas in India. Improving national governance requires successful coalition building both within and outside Parliament. There was no need for this in Gujarat. The state-level experience also has hardly any relevance for successfully implementing a model of cooperative federalism, which is crucial for steering forward as diverse and complex an economy as India. In fact, Modi may have to un-learn some of the Gujarat experience, especially for successfully completing India’s social transition, which requires sensitive handling of critical issues like potential communal conflicts, caste divisions and regional disparities. Modi will do well to recognise that successful policymaking for India is a far bigger and more complex task than merely scaling up his project-oriented approach in Gujarat.

然而莫迪在古吉拉特的成功经历在印度全国层面上只有部分是可复制的。古吉拉特邦的行政权力高度集中在首席部长的手里，这一点是该邦政府治理得以改善的核心前提，然而这完全不可能被复制到复杂且极其多元化的印度国家政治版图上。提升国家层面的政府治理水平要求成功地在国会内外建立起广泛的联盟，而在古吉拉特则并不需要做到这些。此外，在邦一级的施政经历与在国家层面上成功地实现合作联邦主义之间也鲜有联系，而这对于领导像印度这样一个多元而复杂的经济体持续进步是至关重要的。事实上，也许莫迪需要忘掉一些他过去在古吉拉特的经验，尤其在成功地完成印度的社会转型方面，这要求领导人在处理潜在的社群冲突、种姓制度和地区发展不平衡这些敏感问题方面拥有灵活的政治手腕。莫迪肯定将会清楚地认识到，成功地为印度这个国家制定政策，相比仅仅将他之前在古吉拉特以项目为核心的施政方法推广到一个更高层次，是一个庞大得多也要复杂得多的问题。

Premiership and experience in Delhi
就任总理和新德里的经历

Modi’s two years in Delhi, as I have covered in Chapter IV of my book, have seen extraordinary government activity as part of Modi’s rather explicit and well articulated attempt to establish an efficient ‘development state’ in Delhi. Any assumption that Modi is a follower of the Washington Consensus or sees himself in the Reagan/Thatcher mould is totally misplaced. Modi is impressed by the East Asian model and sees an active role of the State as a necessary condition for pursuing India’s development goals.

正如我在新书的第四章中提到的，在莫迪就任总理后的两年中，作为他明确而清晰地试图在新德里建立起一个高效的“发展型国家”计划的一部分，印度政府进行了许多不同寻常的活动。任何把莫迪看作华盛顿共识的追随者，或者认为他会把自己看作里根/撒切尔模式效仿者的假设都完全搞错了。莫迪对于东亚模式印象深刻，而他也认为政府的积极作用在印度实现自身发展目标的进程中是一个必不可少的条件。

Second, Modi has learnt from the experience of previous governments, both in Delhi and in some provinces, that it is politically disastrous for his government to be seen as pro-reformist because, unfortunately, reforms that have supported liberalisation are seen to be pro-rich and anti-poor. Modi has therefore taken pains to ensure that his reformist agenda in his first two years is strongly inclusive. This is reflected in a slew of schemes like the Jan Dhan Yojna (financial inclusion scheme) under which more than 200 million new bank accounts, some with zero balances, have been opened within the project’s first 18 months. Modi will make sure that his reform agenda is consistently seen as benefitting the ‘common man’ and not private businessmen or the well heeled.

第二，莫迪从之前的印度中央政府和一些州政府的经验中了解到，如果他的政府被视作积极的改革派，在政治上的后果将是灾难性的，因为之前印度国内那些支持自由化的改革都不幸地被人们视作劫贫济富。于是莫迪不得不承担了一些代价来保证他执政前两年中的改革日程表是高度包容性的。这表现在一系列的安排上，例如“金融包容计划”，该计划在其实施的前18个月内在印度全国范围内开立了超过2亿个新的银行账户，尽管其中一些账号上根本没有任何资金。莫迪需要保证他所推行的改革日程表将一直被人们视为是惠及“普通人”的，而不是那些私营商人和富裕阶层。

Third, as evidenced from his Gujarat experience, Modi’s strong suit is project execution based on close monitoring and regular tracking of performance. He is therefore more inclined to ‘cumulative incrementalism’, rather than announcing big-bang, headline-grabbing reforms. This has the advantage of ensuring that projects that are announced have a greater probability of being completed in a time-bound manner. However, the downside is that it generates a perception of continued reform inertia and perhaps also an inability to trigger a strong upturn in private investor sentiment, which remains exceptionally weak after two years of the Modi government.

第三，莫迪在古吉拉特的经历证明了他的强项是通过紧密的监控和对绩效的常规化跟踪来推进项目的执行。因此他更倾向于“累积性渐进主义”，而不是宣布一些爆炸性的会登上新闻头条的改革措施。这种倾向的优势在于能够保证那些已经被宣布的工程有更大可能性在规定时间内完工。然而其劣势则在于它让人们产生了一种当前改革的惯性将会持续下去的预期，也许人们还会认为他无力扭转当前疲弱的私人投资者情绪，而在莫迪政府上台的两年内，这种情绪一直处于极为低迷的状态。

In my book, I also identify several daunting challenges that Modi faces in taking India towards its desired and feasible goal of becoming a prosperous economy by 2047, which will mark the centenary of its independence from British rule. The principal argument is that in some areas – like macroeconomic management, education, agriculture, manufacturing and exports, and infrastructure – Modi’s current business-as-usual approach with reforms at the margins will not work. In these sectors an innovative approach including a programme of structural reforms and a clean break from the past are required.

我在书中还指出了几个莫迪在领导印度走向这个国家所向往且现实的目标——即在在2047年也就是摆脱英国殖民成为一个独立国家满一个世纪时成为一个繁荣国家——的道路上将会遇上的一些令人头疼的挑战。我的主要论点是，在一些领域——例如宏观经济管理、教育、农业、制造业和出口以及基础设施建设，莫迪当前所采取的在总体上“一切如常”而仅仅在边际上进行改革的做法将无法奏效。这些部门内的改革都要求包括结构性改革计划在内的创新型方法，并且必须与之前的模式一刀两断。

The best example of such an approach that Modi can implement would be to change the policy goal from GDP growth to maximising the rate of growth in employment generation. This is critically needed if India is to meet its extraordinary goal of generating as many as one million jobs per month, which are needed to absorb the net accretion to its workforce. The goal of maximising employment generation will yield a number of policy prescriptions, including taking urgent supply-side measures to address any emerging shortages of wage goods (food and basic necessities), which could result in sharp inflationary spikes that would disrupt both economic activity and management.

对于莫迪而言，实践这种创新型方法最好的试验场就是将政策目标从追求GDP增长率转变为最大化就业增长率。这一转变对于印度实现其每月创造一百万个工作岗位的宏大目标极其重要，而这一目标的初衷是为了吸收印度劳动力队伍的净增长。最大化就业增长率这一目标对应着一系列的政策药方，其中包括采取紧急的供给侧措施以解决任何正在浮现的工资品（食品和生活必需品）短缺问题。该问题可能会引起通胀率的急剧攀升，从而干扰经济活动和政府治理的顺利进行。

Employment maximisation will also imply active promotion of labour intensive manufactured exports. This will require a radical shift away from using fiscal subsidies to promote particular exports, which has evidently failed, to focusing on infrastructure development that will permit more effective integration of Indian manufacturing capacities in regional and global trade flows. In the book, I go on to suggest an agenda of structural reforms in five selected sectors to reinforce the central argument that a business-as-usual approach will not suffice for Modi to meet the extraordinary challenges facing India. Along with ensuring greater inclusion by improving governance and putting in place an efficient development state, Modi will have to adopt innovative structural reforms for him to meet the aspirations of a young Indian population that supported him in the hope that he will accelerate the pace of employment generation and India’s march to prosperity.

促进充分就业还意味着积极地推进劳动密集型的制造业出口。这就要求完全抛弃之前已经被证明失败了的使用财政补贴以推进某些特定产品的出口的政策路线，而将精力集中在能够促进印度制造业产能在区域性和全球贸易往来层面上进行有效整合的基础设施的发展上。在本书中，我进一步提出了在五个特定部门内进行结构性改革的日程表来进一步强化我的中心论点，即对于莫迪来说，“一切如常”的改革方法将不足以让他应对印度的发展中面临的诸多艰巨挑战。除了通过提升政府治理水平和落实一个有效的“发展型国家”计划以保证更强的包容性之外，莫迪还必须采取创新型的结构性改革措施以满足支持他的年轻人群的期待，他们相信他将加快印度的就业增长以及印度走向繁荣的进程。

References
参考文献

Kumar, R (2016), Modi and His Challenges, New Delhi: Bloomsbury.
Kumar, R (2016),《莫迪和它的挑战》，新德里：Bloomsbury出版社
Wignaraja, G (2012), “Deep integration in free trade agreements in China and India”, VoxEU.org
Wignaraja, G(2012),《中印自由贸易协议中的深度整合》，VoxEU.org