The Kremlin’s Theatre of Tyranny
克里姆林宫的暴君戏
Modern Russia is no haven of human rights, but nor is it a “vicious tyranny,” a heavy-handed autocracy, a neo-Stalinism in the remaking or any of the other exercises in horrified hyperbole indulged in by some commentators.
现代俄罗斯并非人权避风港，但它也算不上“邪恶暴政”、铁腕独裁，或某些评论家乐此不疲的怂人听闻——新斯大林主义东山再起。
The irony, though, is that sometimes it suits the Kremlin to seem so. If in the days when archetypal political technologist Vladislav Surkov was the Kremlin’s choreographer in chief, the name of the dramaturgiya was fake democracy, then today it often appears to be fake tyranny.
不过讽刺的是，有时候克里姆林宫看上去还真好像配得上这些评价。如果说在弗拉基斯拉夫·苏尔科夫这位典型的政治技术家担任克里姆林宫舞蹈总监时【译注：苏尔科夫是俄罗斯“主权民主”概念的主要提出者，该概念意在区别于西式民主】，演技（dramaturgiya）的定义叫做“伪民主”的话，那么如今它似乎更应该叫做“伪专制”。
Shooting Itself in the Foot?
砸自己的脚？
Consider, for example, the latest, spine-chilling initiative of the Duma, granting the security forces the right to open fire on crowds, on women (so long as they do not appear pregnant, a bizarre humanitarian grace note or a genuflection to the need to reverse demographic decline?), or even on the disabled, if necessary to prevent or defeat a terrorist attack.
比如，想想国家杜马最近通过的那个令人不寒而栗的法案吧。该法案授予安全部队为阻止或打击恐怖主义，必要时可以对人群、妇女开火（怀孕的除外，这到底是个奇怪的人道主义装饰音符呢，还是为了扭转人口衰退的不得已之举呢？），甚至对残疾人开火的权利。
Between the very subject matter – time to pass some new macabre ordnance on the right way and time to shoot your own citizens – and what it seems to say about the Kremlin’s fear of its own people, it understandably attracted attention and alarm amongst both Russian and Western observers.
不难理解，这一事件本身——是时候该颁布新规：如何在正确的时间和方法对付本国公民——以及它所透露出的克里姆林宫对自己人民的恐惧，都引来了包括俄国和西方在内的观察人士的注意及警惕。
And so it should, especially as it coincides with apparent moves to strengthen the very arms of the state most concerned with suppressing the populace. While the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) as a whole, for example, has had to absorb a 10% across the board budget cut, the OMON riot police appear to have been protected from any cuts. Although they represent only a small proportion of the MVD, nonetheless that inevitably means more cuts in regular, front-line policing.
这是理所应当的，特别是此事发生的同时，俄国还明显采取行动要强化与镇压民众最为密切相关的政府强力部门。比如，虽然内务部（MVD）作为一个整体必须承受10%的全面预算削减，但“特种部队”（OMON）的防暴警察似乎得以免遭任何削减。虽然他们只是内务部里的一个小单位，但即便如此，这也必然意味着普通的一线警务将承担更多的预算削减。
Indeed, it emerged that the MVD is investing in, amongst other projects, lots more of a type of grenade launcher called the RGS-50M, increasing its stocks of them five-fold. This is essentially an anti-riot weapon, used to fire rubber bullets and stun and gas grenades, and very much an OMON toy.
事实上，我们发现，内务部投入的许多项目中，有一项是加大力度购买某种叫做RG5-50M的枪榴弹发射器，其在内务部的存量已经翻了5倍。这主要是一种防暴武器，用于发射橡胶子弹、眩晕手榴弹和毒气手榴弹，基本上就是OMON的玩具。
Put together, all this suggests that the Kremlin, perhaps aware that the regime’s standing is rather less secure than those misleading sky-high personal approval ratings for Putin might suggest, is arming itself against some Moscow Maidan. With labor unrest on the rise – the truckers protesting road tolls are just the most visible tip of a disgruntled iceberg – and the 2016 Duma elections bound to focus public attention on promises made and broken, they may have a point.
所有这些综合起来看，表明克里姆林宫可能意识到，俄政权的地位并不像普京那些极高的个人支持率所错误显示的那样牢靠，因而正在武装自己，防止某种“莫斯科广场革命”发生。由于劳工骚乱在增加——抗议收取过路费的卡车司机只是愤怒冰山上最为醒目的一个小角，且2016年杜马选举必将吸引民众对选举许下的承诺和未实现的许诺的关注，克里姆林宫可能没想错。
Certainly news that the government, not least the Federal Protection Service (FSO), the Kremlin’s Praetorians, are monitoring opinion in the localities and throwing money at those looking most likely to experience unrest, seems also to suggest this.
当然，也有新闻提到，俄罗斯政府，尤其是身为克里姆林宫“禁卫军”的联邦警卫署（FSO）正在监测各地舆情，并且正在向那些最可能出现骚乱的地方砸钱。这似乎也能说明问题。
The interesting thing, though, is that the news of the RGS-50M purchase was covered by government news outlet TASS. And quite why did the Duma (because let’s face it, while a forum for all kinds of crazies to say all kind of crazy things, it doesn’t go to the bathroom without the nod from the Kremlin, let alone pass a bill) actually feel the need to enshrine the dos and don’t see of massacre in a law?
不过，有趣的是，购买RGS-50M的新闻是由政府新闻机构塔斯社报道出来的。而且杜马究竟为什么觉得有必要将“大屠杀指南”写进法律也是个问题（因为，说实在的，尽管杜马是个各种疯子在一起讨论各种疯事的论坛，但要是没有克里姆林宫点头，它连厕所都不敢上，遑论通过什么法律）。
Here, after all, is the dirty little secret of all governments: when they feel they must, they kill, and generally wherever and whenever the circumstances dictate. The Federal Security Service (FSB), the main subject of the new law, would not check the statute books before shooting presumed terrorists regardless of whether they were women or disabled.
毕竟，我们这里说的是所有政府共有的不可告人的秘密：当他们觉得必要时，只要为形势所迫，无论何时何地，他们都会杀人。新法的主角——联邦警卫署——在射杀可疑恐怖分子之前可不会去翻阅法律全书，不管后者是妇女还是残疾人。
But then again, neither would any Western security service. This is not, after all, a law encouraging heedless massacres and Bloody Sundays to be held every other month. Nor is the FSB governed by the 2011 Law on Police, which does set definite guidelines on the use of lethal and non-lethal force. So why make a song and dance of what would seem to be expressions of combined viciousness and insecurity?
不过话说回来，任何西方安全部门都不会这么做。毕竟这条法律并不是鼓励每隔一个月来一次随性的大屠杀或“血腥星期天”。联邦警卫署也不属2011年《警察法》管辖，但该法倒确实对使用致命和非致命武力有明确指导。所以，问题来了，为什么要载歌载舞的演这么一出给世人看，而其内容看起来仅仅是在表达邪恶与不安全感呢？
The Kremlin’s Gold Standard
克里姆林宫的黄金标准
Increasingly, it is references in the press to First Deputy Interior Minister Viktor Zolotov that seem to represent the gold standard, pun intended, of the Kremlin’s scare tactics. The former head of Putin’s bodyguard and one of his judo sparring partners, Zolotov has the reputation of being a maximalist in waiting, the kind of political policeman eager for the orders to deploy the knout and the iron fist.
媒体对内务部第一副部长维克托·佐罗托夫的报道，正日益成为克里姆林宫恐吓战术的黄金标准（此处一语双关）。佐罗托夫曾是普京的保镖头目，还是他的柔道陪练。他以随时待命的“最高纲领派”而出名，是那种极度渴望受命使用皮鞭和铁拳的政治警察。
After years as head of the presidential security detail, in 2013 he was moved to the MVD where he quickly rose from deputy commander of the Interior Troops to first deputy minister in charge of, hardly incidentally, this militarized domestic security force.
佐罗托夫曾任总统警卫部队负责人多年，于2013年调往内务部，很快就从内务部队副司令升为掌管这一负责国内保卫的军事力量的第一副部长，这绝非偶然。
Periodically, rumors float around in the press that he is poised to replace Interior Minister Viktor Kolokoltsev, a career policeman who, despite occasional forays into the kind of aggressive rhetoric seemingly expected of someone in his job, shows every sign of wanting to be a cop rather than a political enforcer.
媒体上定期地出现同样的谣言，说他被钦点接替内务部长维克多·科洛科利采夫。科洛科利采夫是位职业警察，尽管他也不时说出一些身处其位者可以预料会说出的咄咄逼人的言辞，但种种迹象表明他就是想做一个警察，而不想做政治打手。
Kolokoltsev succeeded a career political policeman, the former KGB officer Rashid Nurgaliev, and he was greeted with relief and enthusiasm within the MVD. Moving another political policeman into his office would likely be unpopular with the rank and file, as well as being a depressing symbol of a newly-repressive turn from the Kremlin.
科洛科利采夫的前任是一位职业政治警察，前KGB特工拉希德·努尔加利耶夫。科洛科利采夫上任时，内务部可是松了口气，热烈欢迎。这个位置上要是再来一个政治警察很可能不太受欢迎，无论是他的资历，还是作为克里姆林宫新压制转向的可悲象征。
However, unless and until the Kremlin feels it needs a tougher hand at the MVD, Zolotov’s greatest value appears to be precisely in his role as the bogeyman. Simply by airing the notion of his ascension, with all that could imply, is a way of signaling both that the Kremlin could empower much more fearsome agents and also that things are by no means as bad as they could be.
不过，除非且直到克里姆林宫当真觉得内务部需要一位更强硬的人手，否则佐罗托夫的更大价值恐怕恰恰在于扮演好他的唬人怪兽角色。只要散布一下他将升职的想法，这一猜想的隐含信息就能起到双重信号作用：既表明克里姆林宫可能把权力交给更为可怕的特工，同时也表明事情远没有到可能的最坏情况。
The Emperor’s New Armor
皇帝的新盔甲
So welcome to the theatre of tyranny. A style of governance which actively encourages the appearance of being tougher and nastier than it really is, and at the same time enthusiastically telegraphs that it could be tougher and nastier still. Behind all this posturing, after all, is a regime which can at best be considered a ‘soft’ or maybe ‘parsimonious’ authoritarianism.
所以，欢迎观看暴政大戏。这种统治风格积极鼓励自己表现得比实际上更为强硬、更为卑鄙，同时还狂热地宣扬自己可以再强硬一些、再卑鄙一些。不过，在所有这类装腔作势背后站着的，却是一个最多只能被视作“软”专制或“吝啬”专制的政权。
This is not in any way to whitewash or condone what it does, which ranges from targeted political trials all the way through to condoning a climate in which journalists dissidents and other inconveniences may be harassed, attacked even killed. We need to recognize the very real cases of abuses of individual rights and political repression.
这么说绝非是要洗白或原谅它的所作所为——从打击目标明确的政治审判，到纵容那些骚扰、攻击甚至杀害异议记者和其他刺头的罪行，等一系列行径。我们要意识到，俄罗斯存在着个人权利遭受损害和政治压迫的真实情形。
However, in many ways and compared with many countries (including, arguably, the West’s uncomfortable NATO ally, Turkey), it is much less profligately abusive than it might be. Its strategy is to deter resistance by making it appear futile and dangerous.
不过，从许多方面看，并与许多其他国家（包括可以说是西方在北约内的尴尬盟国土耳其）相比，俄罗斯的残暴并没有到肆无忌惮的地步，而它本有能力做到这一点。它的战略就是要威慑反抗，让反抗看起来危险无比、看起来徒劳无功。
In this respect, there is a striking parallel between the Kremlin’s foreign and domestic policy. Both depend on making Russia appear not only stronger than it is, but more ruthless, unpredictable and downright crazy, so it seems easier to accommodate than challenge it.
就此而言，克里姆林宫的对外与对内政策之间存在一个惊人的相似之处。两者都依赖于一个办法：不仅要把俄罗斯塑造得比实际更为强悍，而且要塑造得更为残暴、更反复无常、更疯狂透顶，从而使得与之通融协调显得比与之对抗挑战要容易。
And it works really well. Until the day that it meets someone more ruthless, unpredictable and crazy (whether Islamic State or Erdogan) or someone happens to wonder just how strong the emperor’s new armor really is.
这个办法效果很不错。除非有一天它撞上了一个更残暴、更无常并且更疯狂的家伙（不管是伊斯兰国还是埃尔多安），或者撞上了一个碰巧想要弄清皇帝的这套新铠甲到底有多牢靠的家伙。
翻译：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy）
校对：龟海海
编辑：辉格@whigzhou