New documents allege Mugabe’s complicity in 1980s massacres
新文档指证穆加贝参与了80年代的一系列屠杀
Thousands of historical documents are becoming available in a raft of foreign archival collections. The documents are wide-ranging and allege what survivors and scholars have always suspected but never been able to validate: Robert Mugabe, then Prime Minister, was the prime architect of Matabeleland’s mass killings that were well-planned and systematically executed.
导言：海外的文档收集工作使得数千份历史文档正在浮出水面。这些文档涉及多个领域，并指证了幸存者和学者一直以来无法确认的怀疑：罗伯特·穆加贝，当时的总理，可能是精心策划并得以系统性实施的马塔贝莱兰大屠杀的主要策划者。
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From January 1983, a campaign of terror was waged against the Ndebele people of western Zimbabwe, an outbreak of obscene violence that remains the darkest period in the country’s post-independence history, notwithstanding the bloody notoriety of the last decade-and-a-half.
自1983年一月，一场针对津巴布韦西部恩德贝勒人的恐怖运动被发起，这是一场不堪入目的暴行的开端，至今仍是这个国家独立后历史中最黑暗的时期。尽管该国近十五年来的历史之血腥也已臭名昭著。【译注：2000年该国政府启动了强制土改政策。】
But now, the new light is being shed on these days of horror.
但是现在，这些恐怖的岁月正被重新审视。
Thousands of historical documents that appear to expose the perpetrators are now becoming available in a raft of foreign archival collections. The documents are wide-ranging and include, among others, diplomatic correspondence, intelligence assessments and raw intelligence garnered by spies recruited from within the Zimbabwean government.
海外的文档收集工作使得数千份历史文档正在浮出水面。这些文件似乎揭示了屠杀的真凶。这些文件涉及多个领域，包括但不限于：外交文书，情报评估和津巴布韦政府内部线人收集的原始情报。
These papers—augmented by the testimony of Zimbabwean witnesses finding courage in old age—appear to substantiate what survivors and scholars have always suspected but never been able to validate: Mugabe, then Prime Minister, was the prime architect of mass killings that were well-planned and systematically executed.
一些津巴布韦目击者在晚年鼓起勇气做出的证言进一步增加了这些文档的分量。目前看来，这些文件证实了幸存者和学者一直以来无法确认的怀疑：罗伯特·穆加贝，当时的总理，可能是精心策划并被系统实施的大屠杀的主要策划者。
The documents appear to show that the massacres were closely associated with an effort by Mugabe’s Zanu-PF party to eliminate opposition groups in the aftermath of Zimbabwe’s independence. Zapu, a party led by nationalist rival, Joshua Nkomo, represented the main obstacle to that objective. Given that Zapu enjoyed overwhelming support among Ndebele, the Ndebele as a whole came to be seen as an impediment. In the words of Mugabe, the people of Matabeleland needed to be “re-educated”.
这些文件似乎表明，大屠杀和穆加贝的政党——津巴布韦非洲民族联盟-爱国阵线（简称津民盟）——在国家独立后试图消灭反对派的努力紧密相连。津巴布韦非洲人民联盟（简称津人联）是由对手、民族主义者加西亚·恩科莫领导的政党，是津民盟达到该目标的主要障碍。津人联在恩德贝勒人中拥有压倒性优势，故而恩德贝勒人整体被视作一种障碍。按照穆加贝自己的话说，马塔贝莱兰当地人需要被“再教育”。
The little that Mugabe has said since the 1980s on this taboo subject has been a mixture of obfuscation and denial. The closest he has come to admitting any form of official responsibility was at the death of Nkomo (1999), when he remarked that the early 1980s was a “moment of madness”—an ambivalent statement that perhaps reflected a fear of Ngozi (avenging spirits) more than anything else and one he has not repeated. More recently, he blamed the killings on armed bandits who were allegedly coordinated by Zapu (the original smokescreen) along with occasional indiscipline among soldiers of the army’s North Korean-trained 5 Brigade.
自1980年代以来，穆加贝甚少谈及这个禁忌话题。他对此事的稀少评论，其实是混淆和否认的混合物。他最接近于承认官方对屠杀负有任何责任的一次，是在恩科莫1999年过世时。当时他评论说，八十年代早期是个“疯狂时刻”——这个暧昧的表述也许反映了他对怨灵复仇的恐惧甚于其他任何事，而且此后他也再未提过。后来，他将杀戮的责任归咎于据称由津人联负责协调的武装土匪（这是最早释放的迷雾），以及军队第五旅士兵偶发的违纪行为，该旅是朝鲜训练出来的。
In the documents, his alleged co-conspirators tell a different story. In doing so, they controvert theories that Mugabe was poorly informed about the activities of errant subordinates. By March 1983, when news of the atrocities had leaked, prompting Western ambassadors and others to ask awkward questions, government ministers who were overseeing the operation quickly pointed to Mugabe, documents allege.
在文档中，穆加贝所称的阴谋分子讲述了一个不同的故事。他们否定了有关穆加贝对下属违纪行为知之甚少的说法。文档称，到1983年3月，暴行的消息已经走漏，促使西方大使们和其他人问起令人尴尬的问题，监督行动的政府部长们很快指向穆加贝。
Sydney Sekeramayi, the minister in Mugabe’s office with responsibility for Defence, was one. In a conversation with Cephas Msipa, one of the few remaining Zapu ministers of what had been a government of national unity, Sekeramayi, said that “not only was Mugabe fully aware of what was going on—what the 5th Brigade was doing was under Mugabe’s explicit orders.” Msipa later relayed this discussion to the Australian High Commission, which in turn reported it to headquarters in Canberra.
悉尼·塞克拉马伊，穆加贝内阁负责防务的部长，是其中之一。矶法·姆西帕是早先的联合政府中仍在位的少数几个津人联部长之一，在一次与他的对话中，塞克拉马伊说穆加贝“不仅完全知道事件的状况——而且第五旅的所为乃是基于穆加贝的明确命令。”之后姆西帕把这次讨论发送给澳大利亚高级专员公署，后者随即向堪培拉总部做了报告。
Msipa appears to be a credible witness in view of his amicable relationship with Mugabe. He had, for instance, shared a room with Mugabe for two years during their earlier career as teachers. Msipa had also welcomed Mugabe into his home when the latter returned from Ghana in 1960 and joined the struggle against white rule.
从和穆加贝的友好关系来看，姆西帕似乎应是可信的证人。例如，在两人早年一起当教师时，他和穆加贝做过两年室友。1960年，穆加贝从加纳回国加入反对白人统治的斗争时，姆西帕也欢迎他住在自己家。
Between 1980 and 1982, when tensions were rising between Zapu and Zanu, Msipa had served as a regular go-between and had spoken to Mugabe often. He continued to do so during the killings. Within Zapu, Msipa, a Shona-speaker, had consistently advocated amalgamation with Zanu, a line that had attracted the ire of Ndebele-speaking colleagues.
在1980年到1982年间，当津人联和津民盟关系紧张时，姆西帕常常作为一位中间人，频繁的和穆加贝对话。他在屠杀期间也继续这么做。在津人联中，姆西帕作为说绍纳语的一位，一贯支持和津民盟的合并，这一立场曾引起了很多说恩德贝勒语的同事的愤怒。
He was, therefore, considerably more sympathetic to Zanu and its leader than most in Zapu. And yet, after speaking to Sekeramayi and others in Zanu, he was convinced (as he told the Australians) that “the Prime Minister was right behind what had been happening in Matabeleland.” He added that he had never before had such a “crisis of my conscience” about remaining in government.
所以相比于大多数津人联成员，他明显更加同情津民盟及其领导人。然而，在和塞克拉马伊和一些津民盟成员对话之后，他确信（正如他告诉澳大利亚方面的那样）“站在马塔贝莱兰事件后面的正是总理。”他补充道：对于留在政府内任职，他以前从未有过现在这样严重的“良心挣扎”。
Sekeramayi was more circumspect in direct discussions with Western representatives, but nevertheless made clear that the massacres were no accident. The “army had had to act ‘hard’”, he told the British defence attaché, “but … the situation was now under control”. Later, Sekeramayi admitted to the British High Commissioner that “there had been atrocities”.
塞克拉马伊在直接和西方社会代表讨论此事时说话更为谨慎，但他还是很清楚地表明，大屠杀不是意外事件。“军队不得不采取‘酷烈’行动”，他告诉英国武官，“但是……现在形势已经得到了控制”。后来，塞克拉马伊向英国高级专员公署承认“曾有暴行发生”。
The documents also record that Msipa talked to other members of Zanu who revealed that the killings were not simply the whim of a small coterie, but the result of a formal and broad-based decision by the leadership of Zanu-PF. Eddison Zvobgo, a member of Zanu’s 20-member policy-making body, spoke of a “decision of the Central Committee that there had to be a ‘massacre’ of Ndebeles”. That statement squared precisely with 5 Brigade’s ethnocentric modus operandi.
文档也记录了姆西帕和其他津民联成员的谈话，那些成员揭露出屠杀绝不是一个小团伙的心血来潮，而是出自津民联领导层正式且广泛认同的决定。艾迪森·祖沃布戈，津民盟的二十人决策层之一，提到了一份“中央委员会的决定：必须要有一场针对恩德贝勒人的‘屠杀’”。这一说法和第五旅种族中心主义的作案手法完全吻合。
Mugabe’s heir apparent, the current First Vice President, Emmerson Mnangagwa, was a member of the Central Committee. But so, too, were others who have subsequently developed a reputation for moderation, not least because of their latter-day rivalry with Mnangagwa. Former Vice President Joice Mujuru heads that list.
穆加贝的指定继承人，现任第一副总统的埃默森·姆南加古瓦曾是中央委员会的一员。当然，后来展现出温和形象的许多其他人当时也在中央委员会中，他们之所以变温和，相当程度是因为他们此后需要与姆南加古瓦竞争。前副总统乔伊斯·穆朱鲁在这份名单上居首位。
The army commanders who directed the killings, many of whom still retain key positions in a security sector that underwrites the regime, are also shown in the documents to have been eager accomplices. Zvobgo commented that the first commander of 5 Brigade, Perence Shiri, had said the “politicians should leave it to us” with regard to “settling things in Matabeleland”.
文件也曝光了指导屠杀的部队司令官是积极的从犯，其中不少人仍然在强力部门身居高位，维持着这个政权的统治。祖沃布戈提到第五旅的司令官佩伦斯·希里曾说过，对于“搞定在马塔贝莱兰的事情”，“政治家们应该交给我们去做”。
Shiri is now the head of Zimbabwe’s air force.
希里目前是津巴布韦的空军司令。
Testimony from witnesses provides evidence that Shiri worked closely with many former members of Mugabe’s guerilla army, Zanla, notwithstanding a myth that 5 Brigade operated separately from the rest of the army. Those who assisted Shiri allegedly included the now chief of Zimbabwe’s defence forces, Constantine Chiwenga, who was this month awarded a doctorate in ethics by the University of KwaZulu–Natal.
证人证言提供证据说明：希里曾和许多穆加贝游击部队——津巴布韦民族解放军——的前成员密切共事，尽管仍有传言说第五旅是脱离全军单独行动的。那些据称曾协助希里的人包括现任津巴布韦国防部长康斯坦丁·奇温加。他在这个月被夸祖鲁－纳塔尔大学授予了伦理学博士学位。
During the killings, Shiri frequently consulted with Chiwenga, who was then using the nom de guerre Dominic Chinenge and was head of 1 Brigade based in Bulawayo. Chiwenga’s unit also provided a range of practical assistance, including logistical support for 5 Brigade and a base from which Shiri’s men operated when they made punitive raids on Bulawayo’s townships.
在屠杀期间，希里经常向奇温加请教，后者那时化名多米尼克·奇内格，是驻扎在布拉瓦约的第一旅的旅长。奇温加的部队也提供了各种实际支持，包括对第五旅的后勤支持，以及在希里士兵向布拉瓦约的城镇发动惩戒性打击时，为其提供基地。
The first six weeks of 5 Brigade’s attacks were massive in their intensity, but the documentary record shows that an order was given to curtail this phase after news of the massacres began to leak to the outside world. However, the killing did not end, but was instead scaled back and conducted in a more covert manner.
在第五旅袭击的头六周，攻击的烈度极大。但文档记录显示，当大屠杀的消息开始往外界泄露时，上面有命令要求进行收缩。然而，屠杀并没有终止，只是缩小了规模，采取了更秘密的形式。
Estimates of the death toll are frequently put at 20,000, a figure first mooted by Nkomo when the campaign was still underway. But on-the-ground surveys have been piecemeal and vast areas of Matabeleland remain under-researched. Fear and the death of many witnesses provide further challenges.
通常的估计认为死者有约两万人，这个数字最早是恩科莫提出来的，当时屠杀还在进行中。然而现场调查一直是零星散乱的，而且马塔贝莱兰很大部分区域仍未被调查。人们的恐惧，加之很多目击者死亡，也增加了调查难度。
A forensically-accurate number will never be possible, yet it seems possible that the standard estimate is too conservative. Oral testimony from Zimbabweans who were in key government positions during the 1980s disinters a host of killings that were previously unknown. Cumulatively, this testimony suggests that the breadth of the violence and the extent of official involvement could have been significantly underestimated.
一个法医学标准的精确数字也许永远不可能得到，然而通常的估计可能太过保守。1980年代在津巴布韦政府重要岗位任职的一批人的口头证言揭示了许多以前不为人知的杀戮事件。总的来说，这证言暗示暴力的程度和官方牵涉的程度可能被显著低估了。
Observers have always wondered how much of this was known to Western governments—and what they did about it. It is clear from the documents that they knew a great deal, even if some of the detail remained obscure. It is also clear that the polite questions asked by diplomats were—along with courageous representations by churchmen and their allies in Zimbabwe—pivotal to the government’s decision to reduce the violence.
观察家一直好奇于对此事西方社会的政府已经知晓多少？他们对此又做了什么？文档显示，他们无疑知道很多，即使细节仍不清楚。文档也很清楚的表明，外交官有礼节的质询，和教会人士及其津巴布韦盟友们的勇敢发声，这些是政府决定收敛暴行的关键。
Up to that point, there was no indication that the brutal force of the massacres would be curtailed. Nevertheless, Western governments did little once the massacres were brought down to a lower, but still savage, intensity. Perhaps as a sign that Western censure had its limits, the campaign in Matabeleland North continued during the remainder of 1983; 5 Brigade was redeployed further south in 1984.
到那时为止，没有迹象表明当时大屠杀的野蛮暴力会终止。但是一旦大屠杀的烈度变低，即使其仍然残酷，西方社会的政府却没什么作为了。在1983年剩下的时间，北马塔贝莱兰省的战争一直在持续，这仿佛代表了西方抗议的局限性；第五旅在1984年被重新部署到更南部。
It is a fact that the Western response to violence toward black countrymen in the 1980s was a pale shadow of the reaction to his attack on white farmers in 2000. Many Ndebele remain bitter about this inconsistency. While historians debate the dimensions of Zanu’s violence, for Western policy-makers and the domestic constituencies that are meant to hold them to account there’s a need to reflect again on the price of inconsistency in the developing world. Aside from the human cost, Western advocacy of democracy and international justice will continue to be viewed with skepticism while such glaring contradictions remain.
事实上，西方对2000年时穆加贝袭击白人农场主做出了强烈反应，与之相比，他们在1980年代针对黑人村民所遭受暴行的反应要小得多。许多恩德贝勒人仍对这种前后不一心怀怨愤。当历史学家争辩津民盟暴力的程度时，西方的政策制定者和想让他们承担责任的国内选民则需要再次反思这种在发展中国家采取双重标准的代价。如果这么显眼的自相矛盾继续存在，除了生命成本外，西方对民主和国际正义的支持也会继续被人怀疑。
At the same time, an inordinate focus on the international dimensions of the Matabeleland massacres is to miss the point. Mugabe has instinctively sought to racialise and internationalise internal controversies of which he is the principal author or to invoke the spectre of neo-colonialism in the hope of support from fellow African leaders.
同时，对马塔贝莱兰大屠杀的关注过多聚焦于国际视角，这没有切中要害。出于本能，穆加贝常把主要由他引起的国内争端国际化和种族化，或者试图召唤新殖民主义的幽灵，希望借此获得非洲领袖们的支持。
Zimbabwe’s Second Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko recently made the claim that the Matabeleland massacres were “conspiracy of the West” and that Mugabe had nothing to do with them. Yet the new documentary material appears to underline once more that post-independence Zimbabwe’s greatest crimes and deepest wounds lie squarely at the feet of Mugabe and Zanu-PF.
津巴布韦的第二副总统费列克佐拉·姆波科最近声明：马塔贝莱兰大屠杀是“西方的阴谋”，穆加贝和此事没有任何干系。然而新的文档材料似乎再次昭示穆加贝和津民盟－爱国阵线应该为津巴布韦独立后最大的罪行和最深的创伤负责。
The documents appear to show that the killings were an internal affair, neither provoked nor sustained by outsiders, and that the atrocities were driven from the top by Zanu-PF in pursuit of specific political objectives.
现在看来，文档揭示了屠杀是个内政事件，并非由外部力量发起或支持，而且是津民盟－爱国阵线的领袖为了达到特定政治目的而发动。
Viewed across a period of several years and hundreds of files, the documents appear to provide evidence that—far from being a “moment of madness” in which supporters of rival parties went at each other— the massacres were but one component of a sustained and strategic effort to remove all political opposition within five years of independence, as Zanu leaders were determined to secure a “victory” against non-existent opposition in elections scheduled for 1985, after which there would be a “mandate” from the people to impose a one-party state.
经几年时间把数百份文件放在一起审阅，文档似乎证明了大屠杀绝对不是所谓的对立政党支持者相互攻击的“疯狂时刻”。津民盟领袖决意要压制尚未出现的反对，确保在计划于1985年举行的大选中“取得胜利”，以便之后顺应“人民的选择”施行一党专制，因此，大屠杀只是独立后五年内消灭一切政治反对派的持续行为和战略努力中的一环。
Dr Stuart Doran is an independent historian and author of a forthcoming book based on the new documentary material—Kingdom, power, glory: Mugabe, Zanu and the quest for supremacy, 1960–87.
【作者】斯图加特·道朗博士是一位独立历史学家，基于新的文档材料，他所著的《国度，权柄，荣耀：穆加贝，津民盟和对权力巅峰的追求，1960-87》一书即将问世。
Photo: A file picture dated 25 March 2005 shows Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe gesturing during a ZANU-PF rally near the town of Mbaira south of Harare, Zimbabwe. EPA/STR
【图注】一份摄于2005年3月25日的档案照片显示，在哈拉雷以南的玛巴拉镇，津巴布韦总统罗伯特·穆加贝在津巴布韦非洲民族联盟－爱国阵线（ZANU-PF）的集会上振臂高呼。
翻译：Tankman
校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy）
编辑：辉格@whigzhou