When Courts Compete for ‘Business,’ Liberty Wins
当法庭之间争夺“生意”时，自由就是赢家
Those who insist that market anarchism cannot work because it lacks a monopolistic court of final jurisdiction are wrong.
那些坚持认为市场无政府主义因为缺乏垄断性法庭的终审管辖而行不通的想法是错误的
Considering that what liberty we continue to enjoy in the West is a product in large part of competing legal institutions operating within overlapping jurisdictions hundreds of years ago, it’s curious that so many libertarians still believe such an order—an essential feature of free-market, or natural-law, anarchism—would be inimical to liberty. Why wouldn’t that which produced liberty be up to preserving it?
考虑到我们在西方所持久享受的自由其实很大一部分是数百年前管辖界限互相重叠的司法制度之间相互竞争的结果，很奇怪的是，现在却有许多自由意志主义者依然相信这样一种秩序——核心特征是自由市场、或自然法、或无政府主义——将对自由不利。为什么那些产生了自由本身的事物无法承担起维持自由的责任呢？
When I say that competition produced liberty, I of course do not mean that liberty was anyone’s objective. Yet liberty emerged all the same, as if by an “invisible hand.” That’s how things often work. Good (and bad) consequences can be the result of human action but not of human design (to use a favorite phrase of F. A. Hayek’s, which he borrowed from the Scottish Enlightenment thinker Adam Ferguson).
当我说竞争产生自由时，我当然并不是说自由是谁人的目标。然而自由还是一样产生了，就像一只“看不见的手”创造出来的一样。这就是很多情况下事物的运作方式。好的（和坏的）后果可能是人类行为而不是人类设计的结果（这是哈耶克从著名苏格兰启蒙主义思想家Adam Ferguson那里借用的口头禅）。
We should be delighted to know that something so wonderful as liberty can emerge unintentionally. It should give us hope for the future; if the libertarian movement is deficient, we need not assume that liberty has no chance. (I have more to say about liberty as an unintended consequence in the context of Magna Carta here.)
得知像自由那样美好的事物会非意图地产生，我们应该感到高兴。这会给我们的未来带来希望；如果自由意志主义运动是有缺陷的，我们却不必认为自由已经没有了机会。（关于自由在《大宪章》语境中是个意外产物，我还有更多的话要说，戳这里。）
Many authors from the 18th century onward have written about the unintended good consequences of competition, i.e., the absence of central control. They emphasized that in the West the rivalries between church and state, between nobles or parliament and crown, and between nation-states yielded zones of liberty that endure to this day, however diminished in particular matters.
18世纪以来，许多作者已经描写过竞争（即中央控制的缺失）所带来的意外好处。他们强调，西方世界中教会和世俗国家的斗争，贵族或议会和王权的斗争，以及民族国家之间的斗争，产生了延续至今的自由空间，不管这一空间在一些特定方面衰减得有多么厉害。
Competition among legal institutions—courts and bodies of law—within overlapping jurisdictions played a large role in this centuries-long beneficent process. These of course are not examples of anarchism; on the contrary, states existed. But competitive overlapping legal regimes are an element of market anarchism.
管辖界限互相交错的司法制度——各法庭和各法体【编注：一个法体是指有着独特渊源和内在一致性的一组法律规则，比如衡平法、海事法、战争法分属不同法体。】——之间的竞争在这场持续数个世纪的有益历程中扮演了重要角色。这些当然不是无政府主义的例证，恰恰相反，国家是存在的。但是司法制度之间的交叉竞争是市场无政府主义的一个组成元素。
So where a state coexisted with a polycentric legal order, we may say, with Bryan Caplan, that there existed “less than the minimum” state, that is, something that fell short of the nightwatchman state favored by limited-government libertarians.
所以当一个国家存在一种多中心的法律秩序时，我们可以用Bryan Caplan的话来说，这里就存在着一种“比最小国家更弱一点”的国家，也就是说，比喜欢有限政府的自由意志主义者所期待的守夜人政府更弱一点的东西。
A good place to read about competition in law and dispute resolution is Todd J. Zywicki’s highly accessible Northwestern University Law Review article “The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis.”
Todd J.Zywicki发表在Northwestern University Law Reviews上的文章“普通法中的效率兴衰史：一种供给侧分析”是一篇了解法律和争端解决机制中的竞争情形的深入浅出的文章。
An important feature that “influenced the common law’s evolution,” Zywicki writes, “was the competitive, or ‘polycentric,’ legal order in which the common law developed. During the era that the common law developed, there were multiple English courts with overlapping jurisdictions over most of the issues that comprise the common law. As a result, parties potentially could bring a particular lawsuit in a variety of different courts. In turn this created competition among these various courts for business.”
一个“影响到了普通法进化的重要特征”，Zywicki写到：“是竞争性的，或者说是“多中心”的法律秩序，普通法就是在其中演化的。在普通法产生的时代，在构成普通法的绝大多数问题上都有很多管辖界限重叠的英格兰法庭（存在竞争）。结果就是当事人有可能从很多不同的法庭中选择一个来进行特定的诉讼。于是，这些法庭之间就产生了生意上的竞争。”
The idea of courts competing for “business” sounds strange to modern ears, but it was commonplace before the 20th century. (The extent of private arbitration in international commerce is largely unappreciated.)
对于现代人来说，法庭在“生意”方面进行竞争这个想法听起来很怪，但是在二十世纪之前这是很常见的。（在这方面，私人仲裁在国际贸易中的普及程度并没有受到应有的注意）。
Zywicki’s paper shows that the common law, which featured this competition, was efficient in the eyes of those who used its services. Monopoly is inefficient even (especially?) in matters of security, dispute resolution, and justice. Moreover, it’s a mistake, as Hayek explains in Law, Legislation, and Liberty (volume 1) to assume that government is the source of law.
Zywicki的论文指出，有这种竞争特色的普通法在那些使用其服务的人们眼中是有效的。垄断性司法甚至（或者说尤其是？）在安全、调解纠纷和司法制裁方面都是效率低下的。此外，哈耶克在《法律、立法与自由》中指出，认为政府是法律源头的想法是极其错误的。
Moves away from competition and the common law, then, aren’t adequately explained by shortcomings in its services to its consumers. Political ambition provides a more satisfactory explanation. (In the case of the criminal law, see this.)
因此，对司法竞争性与普通法传统的偏离，单从当事人所得服务有所欠缺这一角度是不能充分解释的。政治野心是一个更为令人满意的解释（至于刑法的情况，参见这里）
Zywicki draws on the legal historian Harold Berman, who wrote, “Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the Western legal tradition is the coexistence and competition within the same community of diverse jurisdictions and diverse legal systems.”
Zywicki引用了法律史学家Harold Berman的话：“也许西方法律传统的最与众不同之处在于多样化的司法管辖权和多种法律体系在同一个共同体内部共存和竞争。”
The legal philosopher Lon L. Fuller went further: “A possible objection to the view [of law] taken here is that it permits the existence of more than one legal system governing the same population. The answer is, of course, that such multiple systems do exist and have in history been more common than unitary systems.” (Emphasis added.)
法哲学家Lon L.Fuller进一步指出：“对这种（法律）概念的一个可能的反对意见是，它允许多个司法体系管辖同一个人群。当然，对此的回答是：这样的重合体系确实存在，并且在历史上比一元化的（司法）体系更为常见”。
The limited-government libertarian who insists that market anarchism cannot work because it lacks a monopolistic court of final jurisiction is like the apocryphal aerodynamicist who calculated that a bumblebee couldn’t possibly fly. One needed only to point out the window, saying, “Behold!” Likewise, the anarchist need only point to history.
有些相信有限政府的自由意志主义者坚持认为，市场无政府主义行不通，因为它缺乏能够实行最后裁决的垄断性法院。这就像假冒的空气动力学家计算得出大黄蜂根本无法飞起来一样。实际上我们只需要朝窗外指指说：“看呐！”。同样，无政府主义者只需要拿出历史事实。
Berman also wrote (quoted by Zywicki), “The same person might be subject to the ecclesiastical courts in one type of case, the king’s courts in another, his lord’s courts in a third, the manorial court in a fourth, a town court in a fifth, [and] a merchants’ court in a sixth.” This sounds as though the courts were not really competitive, but rather that the variety of courts constituted specialization and a division of labor.
Berman又写道（引用自Zywicki）：“同样的一个人可能在某种案子中服从于宗教法庭，在另外一种案子中则可能服从国王的法庭，也可能是其领主的法庭，又可能是庄园的法庭，城镇法庭，甚至是商人法庭。”听起来好像各个法庭并不存在真实的互相竞争关系，不同法庭之间存在专业区分和劳动分工。
But that inference would be wrong. To see this we may turn to a keen contemporaneous observer, Adam Smith. In The Wealth of Nations Smith notes that despite a de jure division of labor, courts in fact competed with one another, even to the point of entrepreneurially finding ways to lure cases from other courts.
但是这样的推断是错误的。为了了解这一点，我们可以求助于同时代的一位敏锐观察者，亚当·斯密。在《国富论》中，斯密提到，尽管从法理上来说，法庭之间存在劳动分工，但事实上他们是相互竞争的，竞争甚至到了多方钻营以从其他法庭中诱拐案件的程度。
Why do this? Because the courts obtained their revenues from fees paid by parties to cases. The more cases a court heard, the more money it earned, a state of affairs that Smith, no anarchist of course, approved of: “Public services are never better performed than when their reward comes only in consequence of their being performed, and is proportioned to the diligence employed in performing them.”
为什么要这样做呢？因为法庭的经费来自案件各方所支付的费用。一个法庭开审的案件越多，那么得到的金钱就越多，斯密当然不是一位无政府主义者，但他赞成这样的一种状态：“公共服务办好才给予酬劳，并且按勤勉的程度决定酬额，这样才能办好。”
Smith described the legal environment of his day:
斯密这样描述他那个时代的法律环境：
The fees of court seem originally to have been the principal support of the different courts of justice in England. Each court endeavoured to draw to itself as much business as it could, and was, upon that account, willing to take cognisance of many suits which were not originally intended to fall under its jurisdiction.
英格兰各法院最初似乎主要仰赖于法院诉讼费。各法院都尽可能兜揽诉讼事件，那怕本来不是归自己管辖的案件，也乐于受理。例如，单为审理刑事案件而设的高等法院，居然接受民事案件，而以原告声称被告对他所行不义是犯了非法侵害罪或轻罪为受理的口实。
The court of king’s bench, instituted for the trial of criminal causes only, took cognisance of civil suits; the plaintiff pretending that the defendant, in not doing him justice, had been guilty of some trespass or misdemeanour. The court of exchequer, instituted for the levying of the king’s revenue, and for enforcing the payment of such debts only as were due to the king, took cognisance of all other contract debts; the plaintiff alleging that he could not pay the king because the defendant would not pay him.
王室特别法院的设立，本来单是为了征收国王收入和强制人民偿清对于国王所欠债务的。但它后来居然受理关于一切其他契约债务的诉讼，原告陈诉的理由是，被告不偿还对他的债务，所以他不能偿还对国王的债务这个理由。
In consequence of such fictions it came, in many cases, to depend altogether upon the parties before what court they would choose to have their cause tried; and each court endeavoured, by superior dispatch and impartiality, to draw to itself as many causes as it could.
由于这种种的假托，结果许多案件，究竟归哪个法院审理，全由诉讼当事人选择，而各法院要想为自己方面多多招徕诉讼案件，也在审理上力求迅速公平。
The present admirable constitution of the courts of justice in England was, perhaps, originally in a great measure formed by this emulation which anciently took place between their respective judges; each judge endeavouring to give, in his own court, the speediest and most effectual remedy which the law would admit for every sort of injustice. [Emphasis added.]
英格兰今日的法院制度，是值得赞赏的，但一探其究竟，恐怕在很大程度上须归因于往昔各法院法官的相互竞争，对一切不正当行为，各个力求在自己法院就法律许可的范围内给予最迅速最有效的救济这个事实。
Zywicki also quotes from Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence:
Zywicki也引用了斯密在《法学讲稿》中的话：
Another thing which tended to support the liberty of the people and render the proceedings in the courts very exact, was the rivalship which arose betwixt them.
另一件倾向于支持人民的自由和使得法庭程序更为严谨的事务，是法庭之间的竞争关系。
It may be argued that the state provided a backdrop to the competitive legal order, such that a forum of last resort was always available. This argument loses its force, however, when one realizes, as Edward Stringham teaches, that private dispute-resolution procedures arose in matters where states abstained from involvement, such as the nascent stock markets. (For more on the weakness of the “shadow of the State” argument, see this.)
有人可能会认为，竞争性的法律秩序总有国家站在后面，因此终极的裁决平台总是存在。然而，就如Edward Stringham教导的那样：当国家放弃参与时，私人的纠纷解决程序才会出现，就像最初的股票市场那样。只要意识到这一点，上述论调就变得苍白无力。（关于“国家的影子”论调的弱点，详见这里）。
“In short,” Zywicki sums up, “a market for law prevailed, with numerous court systems competing for market share in order to increase their fees. This competitive process generated rules that satisfied the demand of consumers (here litigants) for fairness, consistency, and reasonableness.”
“总而言之，”Zywicki总结道：“法律市场繁盛起来了，很多法庭系统为市场占有率和从中所获费用进行竞争。这一竞争过程产生了符合顾客（这里指诉讼当事人）对公平性、一致性和合理性的需求的规则。”
Bumblebees fly and reasonably pro-freedom dispute resolution emerges without the state, no matter what a cloistered theoretician may think.
不论纸上谈兵的理论家们怎样思考，大黄蜂会飞，公道的、促进自由的纠纷解决方式无需国家也能产生。
翻译：Luis Rightcon（@Rightcon）
校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy）
编辑：辉格@whigzhou