Saving African Rhinos: A Market Success Story
拯救非洲犀牛：一个关于市场成功的故事
【译注：现存犀牛分五种：白犀牛，黑犀牛，苏门答腊犀牛，印度犀牛，爪哇犀牛。本文的白犀牛主要是指白犀牛的亚种南方白犀牛。】
In 1900, the southern white rhinoceros was the most endangered of the world’s five rhinoceros species. Less than 20 rhinos remained in a single reserve in South Africa. By 2010, white rhino numbers had climbed to more than 20,000, making it the most common rhino species on the planet.
在1900年，南方白犀牛曾是世界上五个犀牛物种中最濒危的一种。不到20头犀牛生活在仅存于南非的一个保护区里。到2010年，白犀牛数量攀升至20000头以上，成了这个星球上最常见的犀牛物种。
While southern white rhino numbers rose, populations of the other rhino species declined. This included the African black rhino and three Asian species. Why did the white rhino thrive whereas the others did not? In short, South Africa and a few other African countries adopted policies that created the right incentives for rhino conservation.
当南方白犀牛的数量增加时，其它犀牛物种（包括非洲黑犀牛以及三种亚洲犀牛）的数量却减少了。为什么白犀牛种群繁衍壮大了，而其它犀牛种群没有？简而言之，南非和其它几个非洲国家采用的政策，对犀牛保护产生了正确的激励效果。
BACKGROUND
背景
The white rhino, once plentiful in southern Africa, was all but hunted to extinction in the nineteenth century. As Dutch and English settlers colonized the region, they killed rhinos for meat and sport.
白犀牛曾经大量存在于非洲南部，然而在19世纪被捕猎至几近灭绝。荷兰和英国殖民者在此地区建立起殖民地，他们为取食和娱乐而捕杀犀牛。
By the early twentieth century, only a small population survived in what is now the Hluhluwe-Umfolozi Park in South Africa. Initially a royal hunting area for the Zulu Kingdom, the park was officially protected in 1895. Its population of white rhinos slowly recovered and by the mid-twentieth century had reached the park’s full ecological carrying capacity.
至20世纪早期，只有少量白犀牛还幸存于如今成为南非Hluhluwe-Umfolozi公园的地区。这个公园最初是祖鲁王国的皇家狩猎区，在1895年正式成为保护区。保护区内的白犀牛数量渐渐回升，并在20世纪中期达到了公园生态承载能力的极限。
At that time, the Natal Parks Board decided to take bold action to expand the white rhino population by capturing and relocating animals to new areas. Breeding groups of white rhinos were moved to other state-owned parks, such as Kruger National Park, and also to private game ranches and zoos. This program, known as Operation Rhino, successfully re-established many new breeding groups throughout southern Africa.
就在那时，纳塔尔公园董事会决定采取大胆行动，通过捕获动物并将其迁移至新地区来扩张白犀牛的种群规模。白犀牛繁殖群被迁移到了其它诸如克鲁格国家公园这样的国有公园、私人狩猎牧场和动物园。这个以“犀牛行动”闻名的迁移项目成功地在整个非洲南部重建了许多新的犀牛繁殖群。
By 1960, the white rhino population had grown to 840. The next decade saw increased interest in private game ranching, and in 1968 the first legal white rhino trophy hunt took place.
到1960年，白犀牛数量已增加到了840头。在接下去的十年中，人们对私人狩猎牧场的兴趣不断增加，并在1968年出现了首个合法的白犀牛战利品狩猎。【编注：战利品狩猎是指参与者以获取猎物留作纪念品为主要目的的狩猎活动，与之相对照的另一种商业性狩猎是运动狩猎（sports hunting）】
The Natal Parks Board continued to supply live white rhinos to private landowners for a nominal fee on a first-come, first-served basis. By the mid-1980s, it became clear that there was a problem with this system. A long waiting list of private owners was eager to acquire rhinos for trophy hunting, but they showed little interest in breeding them. This led conservationists to question whether the private sector could actually be entrusted with rhino conservation. On closer examination, however, it appeared the problem was a matter of fixing the incentive structure.
纳塔尔公园董事会继续对私人土地所有者提供活白犀牛，先到先得，只收取象征性费用。到1980年代中期，这项制度的一个问题已显露了出来。有一长串私人地主渴望获得白犀牛来开展战利品狩猎，但他们对养殖白犀牛兴趣寥寥。这使得动物保护主义者质疑私人机构是否能真正被委以保护犀牛的重任。然而，在对情况仔细审视后，人们发现问题关键是要调整激励结构。
PRIVATIZING RHINOS
犀牛的私有化
Before 1991, all wildlife in South Africa was treated by law as res nullius or un-owned property. To reap the benefits of ownership from a wild animal, it had to be killed, captured, or domesticated. This created an incentive to harvest, not protect, valuable wild species— meaning that even if a game rancher paid for a rhino, the rancher could not claim compensation if the rhino left his property or was killed by a poacher.
1991年以前，南非所有的野生动物都被法律当作无主财产（res nullius）对待。对野生动物拥有所有权的好处，就只有通过猎杀、捕获或驯养来获得。这激励了捕猎而非保护珍稀野生物种——意味着即使一个狩猎农场主为一头犀牛付了钱，一旦犀牛离开农场主的所有地或被偷猎者捕杀，农场主将无法索要补偿。
The Natal Parks Board thought that providing rhinos for a low fee—an effective subsidy— would encourage private owners to be good stewards of rhinos. However, a closer look at rhino prices—both for buying and for hunting— suggests that this view was mistaken.
纳塔尔公园董事会曾经认为，提供犀牛时收取较低费用——相当于补贴——将鼓励私有业主对犀牛妥善照料。然而，在仔细考察犀牛价格——包括购买犀牛的价格和捕猎犀牛的价格——后，人们发现这种观点有误。
In 1982, the Natal Parks Board list price for a live white rhino was 1,000 South African rands ®. That same year, the average trophy price was R6,000. Any private landowner receiving a live rhino had a very strong incentive to sell it as a trophy as quickly as possible to pocket a 600 percent profit. The alternative was allowing it to roam on his property where there was a risk of losing it to a poacher or neighbor.
1982年时，纳塔尔公园董事会对一头活白犀牛的明码标价是1,000南非兰特。而同年一头犀牛作为狩猎战利品的均价是6,000兰特。任何得到活犀牛的私人地主都有非常强烈的动机将犀牛作为狩猎战利品尽快卖掉，以便将六倍之利收入囊中。不然，私人地主只能让犀牛在土地上闲逛，犀牛有落入偷猎者或邻居之手的风险。
THINKING CREATIVELY
Rhino poaching is driven by economic forces. If we really want to save the rhino, we must understand how those forces work and look at examples of success stories to see what we can learn from them.创造性思维
偷猎犀牛的行为受经济力量驱使。如果我们真想拯救犀牛，我们就必须了解经济力量是如何起作用的，并看看我们能从那些成功案例中学到什么。For the next three years, as the waiting list for white rhinos grew, the Natal Parks Board tripled its list prices, but demand continued to outstrip the rate of supply. In 1985, a private rancher offered a few rhinos up for auction, prompting the Natal Parks Board to do the same.
接下去三年里，白犀牛的申请名单不断增加，纳塔尔公园董事会将价格升至三倍，然而白犀牛依然供不应求。1985年，一位私人农场主拍卖了几头犀牛，这促使纳塔尔公园董事会也将白犀牛进行拍卖。
In 1986, the board auctioned six rhinos, which sold for an average price of just above R10,000—more than double the list price. Encouraged by this success, the board increasingly embraced the auction system over the next three years, during which time the market price soared to an average of almost R49,000 by 1989.
1986年董事会拍卖了六头犀牛，均价刚刚超过10000兰特——高于标价的两倍。受此鼓励，董事会在此后三年中越来越多地进行犀牛拍卖，而在此期间犀牛的平均市场价格飙升到了1989年的接近49000兰特。
During this same period, the average price for a rhino trophy also rose, but peaked in 1989 at just under R92,000 before pulling back to R80,000 in 1990. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between list prices, auction prices, and trophy prices between 1982 and 1990.
同时期，犀牛作为狩猎战利品的均价也在上升，但在1989年达到了顶峰，价格为略低于每头92000兰特，并在1990年回落到了80000兰特。图1为1982年至1990年间标价、拍得价和战利品价之间的关系。
From 1990 onward, list prices were abandoned and rhinos were mostly auctioned, as the Natal Parks Board realized the benefits of market pricing. By this time the gap between the price of a live rhino and a trophy had narrowed such that the trophy price was only about 60 percent higher than the live price—a more realistic mark-up.
自1990年起，随着纳塔尔公园董事会意识到市场定价带来的益处，标价被废除，绝大部分犀牛被拍卖。此时活犀牛与战利品犀牛的价格差距已经缩小，一头战利品价格只比一头活犀牛价格高了百分之六十——一个现实得多的溢价。
Also during this period, the South African Law Commission addressed the issue of ownership of valuable game animals. Recognizing the problems associated with the res nullius maxim, the commission drafted a new piece of legislation: the theft of game act of 1991. This policy allowed for private ownership of any wild animal that could be identified according to certain criteria such as a brand or ear tag.
还是在这一时期，南非法律委员会着手处理有关珍稀狩猎动物所有权的问题。委员会意识到，这些问题涉及无主财产准则，便起草了一项新的立法：《1991年猎物偷盗法案》。按照这项政策，任何野生动物的私人所有权可以根据确切的判别标准来识别，比如烙印或耳牌。
The combined effect of market pricing through auctions and the creation of stronger property rights over rhinos changed the incentives of private ranchers. It now made sense to breed rhinos rather than shoot them as soon as they were received.
通过拍卖实现的市场定价机制，创造对犀牛更牢固的财产权，这二者的共同作用，改变了对私人农场主的激励。养殖犀牛而非一得到犀牛就射杀终于成了明智的做法。
Interestingly, the private market also benefited state agencies such as the Natal Parks Board, which gained from the increased income from rhino sales. From a mere few thousand rands in the early 1980s (the rand/US dollar rate was one to one at this time), the annual market value of live rhino sales grew to R64.5 million (uS$7.8 million) by 2008.
有趣的是，私人市场也使国有机构（比如纳塔尔公园董事会）获益，因为他们通过出售犀牛而获得的收入增加了。出售活犀牛的年市值从1980年代早期的几千兰特（当时兰特对美元汇率为1:1）增长到了2008年的6450万兰特（合780万美元）。
BLACK AND WHITE
黑与白
Not only did the white rhino market grow in value, but white rhino populations also flourished. Figure 2 shows trends in white rhino numbers from 1960 until 2007. Contrast those numbers with the black rhino, which mostly lived in African countries with weak or absent wildlife market institutions such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia. In 1960, about 100,000 black rhinos roamed across Africa, but by the early 1990s poachers had reduced their numbers to less than 2,500.
白犀牛不仅市值增长，种群也繁荣了起来。图2展示了从1960年到2007年的白犀牛数量变化趋势。与之形成鲜明对比的是黑犀牛，主要生活在诸如肯尼亚、坦桑尼亚和赞比亚这些野生动物市场制度薄弱或缺失的非洲国家。1960年时大约有10万头黑犀牛分布在非洲，但到1990年代早期，偷猎者使黑犀牛的数量下降到了不足2500头。
RHINO HORN USES
There are two major markets for rhino horn. Throughout Asia, rhino horn has been used for thousands of years for both ornamental and medicinal purposes. Ailments that rhino body parts supposedly cure include skin disease, bone disorders, and fever. The second market for rhino horn is the dagger trade in the Middle Eastern nation of Yemen where carved rhino horns are used as handles for ceremonial daggers called jambiyas.犀牛角的用途
犀牛角有两个主要市场。在整个亚洲，犀牛角被用作装饰和药材已有上千年的历史。人们认为犀牛的身体部位可以用来治疗皮肤病、骨骼疾病和发热等病症。中东国家也门的匕首生意是犀牛角的第二个市场，在那里，经过雕刻的犀牛角被用作一种称作jambiyas的仪式性匕首的手柄。Rhino poaching is driven by the demand for rhino horn of both species, which is used for ornamental and medicinal purposes in Asia. Since the mid-1970s, international trade in rhino horn has been subject to a ban under CITES, the United Nations Convention on international trade in Endangered Species. After the CITES ban came into effect, prices for rhino horn soared on black markets and have continued rising ever since.
对两种犀牛牛角的需求驱使了偷猎犀牛的行为。犀牛角在亚洲用于装饰和药材。从1970年代中期开始，根据CITES，即关于濒危物种国际贸易的联合国公约，犀牛角的国际贸易被禁止。自公约生效起，黑市上的犀牛角价格一路飙升。
ABOUT CITES
CITES was formed in the mid-1970s as an international treaty to protect wild species threatened by trade. All member countries (more than 175) agree to regulate the trade in species across their borders in one of two ways. Species are either listed on Appendix 1, under which no trade is allowed, or Appendix 2, under which trade is allowed under a permit system only. About 800 species are listed on Appendix 1 and 32,500 on Appendix 2. CITES employs only a single officer to oversee global enforcement of the treaty.关于CITES
作为一项保护被贸易所威胁的野生物种的国际公约，CITES形成于1970年代中期。所有成员国（超过175个）约定以两种方式之一对通过其边境的物种贸易进行管制。被列入公约附录1的物种被禁止贸易，被列入公约附录2的物种只能在许可证制度下进行贸易。大约有800个物种被列入附录1，而有32500个物种被列入附录2。 CITES只雇佣了一名官员来监督公约在全球的实施情况。By the mid-1990s, rhino poaching had declined to sustainable levels and many conservationists assumed that the CITES ban had solved the problem. Rhino poaching, however, has re-emerged as a serious problem since 2008.
到1990年代中期，偷猎犀牛的行为已减少到了可持续水平，许多动保主义者认为CITES的禁令起了作用。然而自2008年起偷猎犀牛行为再次成为一个严重问题。
A more plausible reason for the temporary respite in poaching pressure is that all the “easy pickings” were gone. Unprotected wild rhino populations are rare to non-existent in modern Africa. The only surviving African rhinos remain either in countries with strong wildlife market institutions (such as South Africa and Namibia) or in intensively protected zones.
对此前偷猎压力暂时缓解的一个更可信的解释是，所有“易得手猎物”都消失了。在现代非洲，不受保护的野生动物数量非常稀少甚至不复存在。幸存的非洲犀牛只存在于那些有强大野生动物市场制度的国家（比如南非和纳米比亚），或在受严密保护的地区。
South Africa and Namibia have replicated the successful approach to white rhino conservation with black rhinos, currently protecting 75 percent of the world’s black rhino population and 96 percent of the white rhino population. After receiving CITES approval in 2004, both countries have even introduced limited black rhino trophy hunting.
南非和纳米比亚在黑犀牛上复制了保护白犀牛的成功方法，目前保护了世界上百分之七十五的黑犀牛和百分之九十六的白犀牛。在2004年得到CITES的批准后，两国甚至都引进了有限的黑犀牛战利品狩猎活动。
CROSSROADS
十字路口
Despite clear evidence that strong property rights and market incentives constitute the most sensible model for rhino conservation in Africa, many international conservationists and policymakers do not recognize this. Through institutions such as CITES, they continue to pursue a command-and-control approach that depends on regulations or bans to restrict wildlife use. This approach now threatens to undermine the success achieved thus far, as the extraordinarily high black market price for rhino horn has fuelled a new poaching drive.
尽管有清楚的证据表明，强有力的财产权和市场激励在非洲构建了最合理的犀牛保护模式，很多国际保护主义者和政策制定者对此依然不予认可。通过诸如CITES这样的机构，他们一直追求一种“命令加控制”的方法，依靠监管和禁令来限制对野生动物的使用。随着犀牛角异乎寻常的黑市高价促成了新的偷猎驱动力,这种方法如今威胁到了到目前为止已经取得的成功。
Before the recent upsurge in poaching, Asian nationals attempted to gain legitimate access to rhino horn by posing as trophy hunters. In response, South Africa’s government tightened controls over the hunting industry as well as the sale and use of live rhinos and rhino horn. Unfortunately, these restrictions only seemed to precipitate the current poaching crisis. The demand for rhino horn is significant and persistent enough to be very rewarding to criminals who are willing to supply it.
在最近的偷猎高潮之前，一些亚洲人试图作为战利品猎人而合法获取犀牛角。作为应对，南非政府加紧了对狩猎业以及贩卖和使用活犀牛和犀牛角的控制。不幸的是，这些限制看来仅仅加剧了当下的偷猎危机。对犀牛角的需求足够庞大而持久，这使那些愿意提供犀牛角的罪犯获利颇丰。
THREE RHINO MYTHS
有关犀牛的三个传说
Rhino horn is used as an aphrodisiac in Asia. Rhino horn is used as an ingredient in traditional Chinese medicine to treat serious illnesses involving high fevers and toxicity. In Vietnam, it is sought as a cancer remedy.
犀牛角在亚洲被用作一种壮阳药。犀牛角作为一种传统中药成分，用来治疗伴有高烧和中毒症状的严重疾病。在越南，人们认为犀牛角可以治愈癌症。
Rhino poaching is driven by greed and evil people. Rhino poaching is driven by the high price for rhino horn, which is caused by an artificial supply restriction from the ban in the face of persistent demand, creating perverse incentives.
人性的贪婪邪恶驱动了偷猎犀牛行为。面对持续的需求，贸易禁令制造了人为的供应限制，产生了不正当的激励，导致犀牛角的高价，驱动了偷猎犀牛行为。
The medicinal demand for rhino horn is unscientific and therefore not legitimate. Use of rhino horns in Chinese medicine has cultural roots going back thousands of years and many of its adherents are unlikely to pay much attention to scientific arguments.
对犀牛角的药用需求缺乏科学根据，因此非法。犀牛角用作中药有数千年的文化根基，因此很多中医拥护者不太会关心有关的科学争论。 South Africa’s game ranchers are also willing to supply the market, and some have already experimented with ways to increase breeding and horn growth rates in a free-range farming environment. Rhino horn is made of keratin (similar to fingernails and hair) and can be periodically and humanely harvested from live rhinos at minimal cost (as little as $20 dollars to sedate an animal and cut off its horns). If the CITES ban was lifted, legal commercial rhino horn production from ranchers could outcompete most illegal harvesting by poachers.
南非的狩猎农场主也愿意向市场供应犀牛，而且一些农场主已经尝试了在放养的农场环境中增加犀牛繁殖和犀牛角生长率的方法。犀牛角由角蛋白（类似于指甲和头发）构成，能周期性地且人道地以最小代价从活犀牛上获得。（麻醉一头犀牛采割牛角的花费低至20美元。）假如CITES的禁令放开，来自农场主的合法商业犀牛角生产便可在竞争中击败绝大多数偷猎者非法获得的犀牛角。
Unfortunately, this pragmatic market solution does not appeal to key international conservationists, who insist that better enforcement and more political will are needed to solve the poaching crisis. Tragically, this may not be enough.
不幸的是，这种务实的市场解决方案对主要的国际保护主义者没有吸引力。他们坚持认为需要更好的执法和更多的政治意愿来解决偷猎危机。可悲的是，更好的执法和更多的政治意愿可能是不够的。
There are many other examples of failed bans, such as alcohol prohibition and the war on drugs, characterized by insufficient incentives to implement them successfully. The market-incentive success story of African rhino conservation may yet be undermined by a failure to recognize and learn from it.
已经有很多禁令失败的例子，比如禁酒和禁毒战争，就是因为没有充分的激励使这些禁令成功实施。市场激励在保护非洲犀牛上取得的成功，可能会由于人们未能认识激励机制并吸取经验而受挫。
MICHAEL ‘T SAS-ROLFES is an environmental economist based in South Africa and a 2011 PERC Lone Mountain Fellow.
作者MICHAEL ‘T SAS-ROLFES是位南非环境经济学家，2011年的 PERC Lone Mountain Fellow。
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