Iran and Saudi Arabia’s cold war is making the Middle East even more dangerous
伊朗和沙特的冷战让中东局势变得愈加危险
2014年一次阅兵中的沙特特种警察
Prince Saud al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, was incensed enough over what was happening in Syria that in a 2013 press conference alongside Secretary of State John Kerry he declared, “I consider Syria an occupied land.”
沙特外交大臣Saud al-Faisal亲王【译注：已于此文发表后不久辞职】对叙利亚局势感到异常愤怒，在2013年与美国国务卿约翰·克里共同出席一次新闻发布会时，他甚至宣称：“我认为叙利亚已经被占领了。”
The occupier, he said, was Iran, which had sent military forces to fight alongside of those of besieged Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad.
他说，占领者就是伊朗，当时伊朗已经派出军队与被反政府武装围困的叙利亚领导人巴沙尔·阿萨德并肩作战。
“How can a neighboring country that’s supposed to uphold good relationships get involved in a civil war and help one side over the other?” he asked.
“一个本该与邻国维持良好关系的国家，怎么能卷入一场邻国的内战，并在其中帮助一方与另一方作战呢？”他问道。
It’s amazing Prince Saud managed to ask his question with straight face. Saudi Arabia was also taking sides, providing large numbers of weapons to rebels in Syria, some of them Islamist extremists who have contributed to the conflict’s downward spiral.
但Saud亲王能如此理直气壮地问出这个问题本身也很令人惊讶。沙特阿拉伯同样在叙利亚内战中有着鲜明的立场，他们向叙利亚反政府武装提供了大量武器，而这些反政府武装中有一部分是伊斯兰极端分子，他们是将冲突引入恶性循环的重要推手。
Syria had become more than just a civil war: it was a proxy conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, both of which were escalating the war in their effort to combat each other.
叙利亚所经历的动荡已经不只是一场内战，它成为了伊朗和沙特之间的一场代理人冲突，在与对方的较量中，双方都不断地将战争升级。
Over the past decade, the Saudis and Iranians have supported opposing political parties, funded opposing armies, and directly waged war against one another’s proxies in Lebanon, Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. While they did not create the crises in those places, they have exacerbated them considerably.
在过去十年间，沙特和伊朗在黎巴嫩、巴林、伊拉克、叙利亚和也门这些国家分别支持着相互对立的政党，为对立的武装提供资金，并且直接操纵代理人向对方的代理人发动战争。虽然这些国家的危机并不是他们直接造成的，但他们却大大地加深了这些危机的严重程度。
Driven by power politics, and fueled by Sunni-Shia sectarianism, the conflict between the two powers — often called the Middle East’s cold war — has become one of the most dangerous elements defining Middle Eastern politics today.
在强权政治的驱动下，加上逊尼派与什叶派之间的教派斗争，伊朗和沙特这两个中东大国之间的冲突——通常被人们称为“中东冷战”——已经成为主导当今中东地区政治局势的最危险因素之一。
As the 2003 Iraq invasion and the uprisings of the Arab Spring have upended status quos across the region, both Saudi Arabia and Iran have rushed in to shape events to their benefit — often at the cost of worsening instability and violence. The more the Iranian-Saudi rivalry escalates, the worse the region is likely to get.
在2003年美国入侵伊拉克和“阿拉伯之春”的动乱打破中东地区原有秩序之后，沙特和伊朗都在努力试图根据自身利益塑造地区事务——而代价通常是让该地区变得更加不稳定，让暴力活动加剧。伊朗和沙特的敌对关系越是升级，中东地区的状况就可能变得越糟糕。
Iran and Saudi Arabia are fighting for supremacy of the Middle East
伊朗和沙特争夺中东地区霸权
1979年，德黑兰，一位支持革命的妇女
The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is, at its core, a competition going back years for power and dominance across the Middle East.
沙特和伊朗之间敌对的核心是双方多年以来对整个中东地区政治权力和主导权的争夺。
“The new Middle East cold war predates the Arab Spring by at least half a decade, but increased Iranian influence in the Arab world dates back even longer,” F. Gregory Gause III, a professor of international affairs at Texas A&M, writes.
“这场新的‘中东冷战’在‘阿拉伯之春’开始之前已经持续了至少5年，而伊朗在阿拉伯世界的影响力上升则可追溯到更早以前，”德克萨斯A&M大学的国际关系教授F. Gregory Gause III 写道。
After Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution toppled the pro-Western shah, the new Islamic Republic established an aggressive foreign policy of exporting the Iranian revolution, attempting to foment Iran-style theocratic uprisings around the Middle East. That was a threat to Saudi Arabia’s heavy influence in the Middle East, and perhaps to the Saudi monarchy itself.
在1979年伊朗的伊斯兰革命推翻了亲西方的国王之后，新建立的伊朗伊斯兰共和国制定了一项旨在输出伊朗革命的激进外交政策，他们试图在整个中东地区煽动伊朗式的神权起义。这对于沙特阿拉伯长期以来在中东地区建立的巨大影响力是一个严重威胁，甚至威及沙特王室本身。
“The fall of the shah and the establishment of the militant Islamic Republic of [founding leader] Ruhollah Khomeini came as a particularly rude shock to the Saudi leadership,” University of Virginia’s William Quandt writes. It “brought to power a man who had explicitly argued that Islam and hereditary kingship were incompatible, a threatening message, to say the least, in [the Saudi capital of] Riyadh.” In response, Saudi Arabia and other ultra-conservative Gulf monarchies formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an organization initially designed to counter and contain Iranian influence.
“伊朗国王的垮台和鲁霍拉·霍梅尼建立的好战的伊斯兰共和国对沙特在中东的领导地位造成了非常猛烈的冲击，”弗吉尼亚大学教授William Quandt写道。“一个明确主张伊斯兰教义与世袭君主制不相容的人获得了权力，对利雅得（沙特首都）来说，这至少是一个威胁的信号。”作为回应，沙特和其他极端保守的海湾地区君主创立了海湾合作委员会（GCC），该组织设立的初衷就是反击和遏制伊朗的影响力。
Iran, weakened by the Iran-Iraq war, backed off of its more aggressive attempts to remake the Middle East in the late 1980s and early 1990s. But the groundwork for conflict was already laid: Saudi Arabia and Iran had come to see each other as dangerous threats. Saudi Arabia sees Iran as bent on overturning a Middle Eastern political order that’s quite friendly to Saudi interests; the Iranians believe the Saudis are actively attempting to keep Iran weak and vulnerable.
由于在两伊战争中实力受到削弱，在上世纪80年代末90年代初，伊朗有所收敛，不再过分激进地试图重塑中东。但是冲突的根基已经埋下：沙特和伊朗开始将对方视作非常危险的威胁。沙特认为伊朗一心想要推翻对于自身利益非常友好的中东政治秩序；而伊朗则相信沙特一直在很积极地试图削弱伊朗，让伊朗变得脆弱。
This creates what political scientists call a security dilemma: one side, fearing attack, ramps up defense spending or supports a regional proxy in order to guard against a perceived threat. The other side sees that as threatening — what if they’re planning to attack? — and feels compelled to respond in kind.
这就造成了一种被政治科学家们称作“安全困境”的局面：困境中的一方害怕受到攻击，通过增加国防支出或者支持区域性代理人来防范自身感知到的威胁；而另一方则将对方的这种行为视作对己方的一种威胁——如果它们是在准备向我们发动攻击呢？——同时觉得自己不得不对此做出针锋相对的反应。
This creates a self-sustaining cycle in which both countries to take actions that are designed to make their country more secure, but end up scaring the other side and thus raising both the chances and the potential severity of conflict.
这就造成了一种自我维持的循环，双方都在采取一些旨在让自己国家变得更加安全的措施，但结果则是让对方感到更加不安，这最终让冲突发生的几率以及冲突的烈度都大大上升了。
“It’s what the US and the Soviet Union were involved in” during the Cold War, Daniel Serwer, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, explains.
“这就是美国和苏联在冷战中所卷入的局面”，约翰·霍普金斯大学高级国际问题研究院教授Daniel Serwer解释道。
Serwer believes the security dilemma “is what really brings us to this point.” The Saudis and Iranians see regional power in zero-sum terms: the more powerful Iran is, the more vulnerable the Saudis feel. And, again, vice versa: “The rationale [the Iranians] give themselves is very heavily defensive,” he says.
Serwer教授相信，正是安全困境“将伊朗和沙特之间的关系带到了今天的局面”。沙特和伊朗都以一种零和的视角看待地区权力：伊朗越强大，沙特就会觉得自己越脆弱，反之亦然。“伊朗人给自己（对沙特采取敌对态度）的理由中有很大一部分都是出于自卫，”他说道。
That’s why proxy struggles in countries such as Syria and Yemen start to seem so important: Saudi Arabia sees Iran backing the Houthi rebellion in Yemen, and believes it’s an initial step toward not just creating chaos in Yemen but overturning the entire regional order that is so important to Saudi Arabia’s security.
这也是为何两国在叙利亚和也门这些国家通过代理人展开的争夺开始显得如此重要的原因：沙特认为伊朗在背后支持也门的胡塞叛军，并相信伊朗的目的并不只是为了在也门制造混乱，这仅仅是伊朗为推翻对沙特的安全至关重要的地区秩序所采取的第一步。
Iran, meanwhile, sees Saudi Arabia arming anti-Assad rebels in Syria and believes the Saudis want to deprive Tehran of an important ally, with the ultimate goal of isolating Iran and surrounding it with hostile regimes.
同时伊朗则认为沙特武装了叙利亚国内的反阿萨德叛军，并相信沙特想要除掉德黑兰的一个重要盟友，其最终目的则是将伊朗孤立起来，让伊朗处于敌对政权的包围之中。
Neither wants the other to gain in influence, so they intervene and counter-intervene. For both, the stakes seem high, so they respond with measures that feel appropriately severe to them: for Saudi Arabia, bombing Yemen’s Houthi rebels and threatening to invade; for Iran, sending more troops and military advisers to Syria. This ends up escalating both conflicts further, heightening the mutual fears and, of course, increasing the suffering of Yemenis and Syrians.
双方都不希望对方获得更大的影响力，所以他们不断地采取干预和反干预的措施。对双方而言，其中牵涉到重大的利益，所以对于对方的行为，他们都采取了自己认为“适度激烈”的应对措施：沙特轰炸了也门的胡塞叛军，并以入侵相威胁；而伊朗则向叙利亚派出了更多的部队和军事顾问。最终这些措施让双方的冲突不断升级，同时也让双方的不安全感不断加深，当然，同时也加深了也门和叙利亚人民所遭受的苦难。
The Iraq War and the Arab Spring set the stage for today’s proxy conflict
伊拉克战争和“阿拉伯之春”为双方当前的代理人冲突埋下了伏笔
伊拉克军队战士，正在美军支持下清扫巴格达由什叶派武装控制的区域，2008年
During the 1990s and early 2000s, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry was fairly quiet. According to both Gause and Serwer, that’s because Iran’s opportunities to challenge the Saudi-led political order were fairly limited. Tehran was just too focused on the threat from Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.
在1990年代和2000年代初，沙特和伊朗之间的敌对关系曾一度相对平静。Gause和Serwer教授都认为，这是因为当时伊朗挑战沙特主导的地区政治秩序的机会非常有限。德黑兰当时的注意力主要放在了伊拉克领导人萨达姆·侯赛因的威胁之上。
Then the US led the 2003 Iraq invasion that toppled Saddam and changed everything. Iran saw an opportunity to strengthen reliable, pro-Iran Shia militant groups (Iraq is majority Shia) and to replace Saddam with a friendlier Shia-led regime — which is exactly what happened.
之后美国在2003年入侵伊拉克，并推翻了萨达姆政权，这改变了一切。伊朗看到了一个机会，加强可靠的亲伊朗什叶派激进团体（伊拉克人口中什叶派占多数）的实力，用一个对自己更友好的由什叶派主导的政权取代萨达姆。这正是随后发生的事情。
“Until the American invasion of Iraq,” Serwer says, “the door wasn’t really open [for Iran to challenge the regional order], except in limited ways like supporting Hezbollah and Hamas.
Serwer教授表示：“直到美国入侵伊拉克之前，除了支持黎巴嫩真主党和哈马斯这些有限的方式之外，伊朗挑战地区秩序的大门并未真正打开。”
“What the United States did in Iraq, by opening the door to the Shia majority, is part of the story for the Saudis.”
“美国在伊拉克所做的一切，为占伊拉克人口多数的什叶派打开了大门，而且也是沙特不得不面临当前局面的部分原因。”
Then the Arab Spring, by toppling governments or inspiring uprisings throughout the region, created a whole new set of openings in which Iran could seek to expand its influence — and Saudi Arabia would struggle to maintain the status quo. When a Saudi-friendly regime was threatened, the Iranians supported the opposition while the Saudis tried to prop them up. When it was an Iranian ally on the brink of collapse, Saudi Arabia tried to push it over the edge while Iran tried to pull it back.
随后到来的“阿拉伯之春”则通过在整个中东地区推翻现有政权或煽动起义的方式，为伊朗在地区内扩大自己的影响力创造了一系列新的机会，而沙特则要力争维持现状。当亲沙特的政权受到威胁时，伊朗人就会支持反对派，而沙特则努力维持现政权的统治。而当伊朗的盟友到了悬崖边上，沙特会努力把他推下去，而伊朗则努力把他拉上来。
In Syria, Saudi Arabia funded and supplied the rebels fighting Iran’s ally Bashar al-Assad; Iran sent troops into the country to defend the government and showered Assad with military aid.
在叙利亚，沙特为那些与伊朗盟友巴沙尔·阿萨德作战的叛军提供资金和补给；而伊朗则派部队进入叙利亚保护阿萨德政府，并为他提供大量军事援助。
In Bahrain, the country’s Shia majority staged pro-democracy protests against the Sunni monarchy; Saudi Arabia, fearing Iranian influence, sent in soldiers to crush the protests.
在巴林，占全国人口多数的什叶派发起了反对逊尼派君主统治的亲民主抗议，出于对伊朗影响的担忧，沙特派军队进入巴林镇压抗议活动。
In Yemen, Iran stepped up its financial and military aid for the Houthi rebels; after the rebels seized the capital Sanaa in early 2015 and began moving to take the rest of it, Saudi Arabia launched a bombing campaign to stop them.
在也门，伊朗不断增加对胡塞叛军的财力和军事援助；而当叛军在2015年初占领了也门首都萨那，并试图进一步占领也门其它地区时，沙特对他们发动了轰炸袭击以阻止他们。
“The retreat of the state made it possible for Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other regional states to play an increasing role in the civil conflicts of Lebanon (for some time), Iraq (since 2003), and Syria (since 2011),” Gause writes. “This is the core, bottom-up dynamic driving the new Middle East cold war.”
“当地政权力量的衰退，使伊朗、沙特阿拉伯和该地区其他一些国家得以在黎巴嫩（在某些时间段内）、伊拉克（自2003年开始）和叙利亚（自2011年开始）的国内冲突中扮演日趋重要的角色成为了可能，”Gause教授写道，“这才是核心：自下而上的对抗态势驱动着新中东冷战。”
Though the conflict isn’t driven by Sunni-Shia hatred, sectarianism makes it especially dangerous
虽然双方的冲突并非起于逊尼派和什叶派的仇恨，教派主义却让形势变得特别危险
一位叙利亚反叛者正在哀悼他死去的同志
Even though Iran is a Shia theocracy and Saudi Arabia is a Sunni theocracy of a different sort, their struggle isn’t really motivated by religion or theology.
虽然伊朗是一个什叶派的神权政体，而沙特则是一个不同形式的逊尼派神权政体，他们之间的斗争却并不是由宗教或是神学原因导致的。
“I don’t think the Saudis and Iranians are engaged in a sectarian war with each other; I think they’re engaged in a balance of power conflict for regional influence,” Gause told me in July.
Gause教授7月份对我说：“我并不认为伊朗人和沙特人之间发生的是一场教派战争，我觉得实际上他们之间发生的是一场争夺地区影响力的事关权力平衡的冲突。”
“But,” he says, “they use sectarianism.” In fact, the Saudi-Iranian struggle is a significant reason for why sectarianism has gotten as bad as it has in the Middle East.
“但是，他们的确利用了教派主义。”他补充道。事实上，沙特和伊朗之间的斗争正是让教派主义问题在当前中东地区变得如此严重的一个显著原因。
Shared sectarian identities make political alliances easier. Sunni governments and rebels are more likely to turn to Saudi Arabia for help; same for Shia groups turning to Iran. And as conflicts go on, their sectarian cast tends to intensify — inviting Saudi and Iranian intervention, which further polarizes countries on sectarian lines.
共同的教派认同会让建立政治同盟变得更容易。逊尼派政府或叛军都更可能向沙特寻求支持，而同样地，对什叶派政府和叛军来说，他们更可能向伊朗寻求支持。而随着冲突持续，教派色彩也趋于强化——例如直接邀请沙特或是伊朗干预，而这种行为则进一步极化了国家间的教派阵线。
“The retreat of the state … drove people in these countries to look to sectarian identities and groups for the protection and material sustenance that the state either could or would no longer provide,” Gause writes. “As sectarianism increasingly defined their struggles, it was natural that they look to co-religionists — Iran for Shia and Saudi Arabia for Sunnis — for that support.”
“国家力量的衰退……促使这些国家的人民到教派认同和教派团体那里去寻求国家所不愿或无法提供的保护和物质支持，”Gause教授写道。“随着斗争中的教派主义色彩变得愈发浓烈，人们自然会向拥有相同宗派信仰的国家寻求支持——什叶派找伊朗，逊尼派则找沙特。”
Take Syria, for example. The country’s crisis began, in 2011, as a non-sectarian mass uprising against the Assad dictatorship. But the Assad regime, which is Alawite Shia and backed by Iran, very explicitly targeted Sunnis in an attempt to make the conflict sectarian and force Syria’s Shia and Christian minorities to rally behind Assad. Saudi backing of Sunni militant groups helped intensify this sectarian divide, ironically playing into Assad’s hands.
以叙利亚为例。叙利亚危机始于2011年，最初发端于一场反对阿萨德独裁统治的人民起义，没有教派性质。而阿萨德政权属于什叶派中的阿拉维派，得到了伊朗的支持。阿萨德政权非常鲜明地将矛头对准了逊尼派，试图将这场危机变成一场教派冲突，以逼迫叙利亚的什叶派和基督教少数族群支持阿萨德。沙特对叙利亚逊尼派激进团体的支持，则进一步加剧了这种教派分裂，而讽刺的是，这正中阿萨德下怀。
The danger of the Iranian-Saudi rivalry is that they’ll replicate Syria’s experience across the Middle East, by intervening and counter-intervening to support Sunni and Shia proxies. The longer this goes on, the more entrenched and violent the regional Sunni-Shia divide will become, in Syria, in Yemen, in Iraq — and who knows where could be next.
伊朗和沙特之间敌对关系的危险之处在于，他们会通过各种干预和反干预措施分别支持什叶派和逊尼派的代理人，在整个中东地区复制叙利亚的经历。而这种状态持续得越久，中东地区逊尼派和什叶派之间的分裂就会愈加根深蒂固，暴力冲突也会愈加剧烈，叙利亚如此，也门和伊拉克也是如此——天知道谁会是下一个。
翻译：Veidt（@Veidt)
校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy），慕白（@李凤阳他说）
编辑：辉格@whigzhou