A Positive Account of Property Rights
关于财产权的实证解释
In thinking and talking about rights, including property rights, it seems natural to put the argument in either moral or legal terms. From the former viewpoint, rights are part of a description of what actions are right or wrong. The fact that I have a right to do something is an argument, although not necessarily a sufficient argument, that someone who prevents me from doing it is acting wrongly.
在我们思考和讨论包括财产权在内的权利时，我们的论证往往自然地使用道德的或者法律的语言。从道德角度来讲，权利是关于行为对错之描述的一部分。我有权利做一件事情这个事实，可以作为论据来论证（尽管未必充分）：阻止我做此事的行为是错误的。
From the legal standpoint, rights are a description either of what the law says or of how it is enforced. On the latter interpretation, “I have a right to do X” translates as something like “If I do X the police will not arrest me; if someone tries to stop me from doing X the police will arrest him.” From this standpoint, one might claim that people in Holland have the right to buy marijuana and people in America have the right to drive 5 miles per hour over the speed limit, even though both are illegal.
从法律角度看，权利是对“法律讲了什么”或者“法律如何被执行”的描述。在第二种阐释中，“我有权利做X”大概可以理解为“假如我做了X，警察不会逮捕我；假如别人试图阻止我做X，警察会逮捕他。”从这个角度来说，我们可以说，荷兰人有权利买大麻，美国人有权利把车子开得比限速快5英里每小时，尽管二者都是违法的。
Both of these approaches have serious difficulties if our goal is to understand the phenomenon of rights, and associated phenomena, as they actually exist in the real world. We frequently observe behavior which looks like the claiming of rights and the recognition of rights in contexts where neither a moral nor a legal account seems relevant.
如果我们旨在理解现实世界中存在的权利现象及其相关现象，那么以上两种方法都有严重困难。我们经常观察到一些好像是在主张权利和认可权利的行为，而相关情境则与道德或法律解释都不相干。
Consider, for example, Great Britain’s “right” to control Hong Kong, Kowloon, and the New Territories. It is difficult to explain Communist China’s willingness to respect that right on legal grounds, given that, from the Maoist standpoint, neither the government of Britain nor previous, non-communist governments with which it had signed agreements were entities entitled to any moral respect.
比如说英国控制香港、九龙及新界的“权利”。从法律层面【译注：从上下文看，此处恐有笔误，“法律层面”似应为“道德层面”】很难解释清楚共产中国为何愿意尊重这一权利（假设事实确实如此），因为从毛主义的立场看，无论是英国政府，还是和它签订条约的以往非共产主义中国政府，都不是在道德上值得给予任何尊重的实体。
It seems equally difficult to explain it on legal grounds, given the general weakness of international law and the fact that for part of the period in question Great Britain (as a member state of the United Nations) was at war with China. An alternative explanation—that the Chinese government believed that British occupation of Hong Kong was in its own interest—seems inconsistent with the Chinese failure to renew the lease on the New Territories, due to expire in 1997.
同样，考虑到国际法总体很羸弱，且当时英国（作为联合国一员）与中国有段时间曾处于战争状态【译注：指朝鲜战争】，想从法律角度解释这一点也很困难。而第三种解释——中国政府认为英国占领香港对自己有利——也和中国拒绝续签将于1997年过期的新界租约这一事实不符。
A second example is presented by the 1982 Falklands war. On the face of it, the clash looks like an attempted trespass repelled. Moral and legal accounts seem irrelevant, given the attitude of Argentina to the British claim. Yet the willingness of Britain to accept costs far out of proportion to the value of the prize being fought over is difficult to explain except on the theory that the British felt they were defending their property, which raises the question of what that concept means in such a context.
第二个例子是1982年的福克兰群岛战争。表面上看，此次冲突就是一次被击退的入侵。考虑到阿根廷对英国之权利主张的态度，道德和法律论述似乎都不相干。然而，英国愿意付出远超受争议领土价值的代价，这一点除非用“英国人觉得他们是在保卫自己的财产权”这一理论，否则很难解释。所以问题来了：财产权的概念在此情境中究竟意味着什么呢？
A further difficulty with moral accounts of rights, in particular of property rights, is the degree to which the property rights that people actually respect seem to depend on facts that are morally irrelevant. This difficulty presents itself in libertarian accounts of property as the problem of initial acquisition. It is far from clear even in principle how unowned resources such as land can become private property.
对权利——特别是财产权——的道德解释所面临的另一个困难是：人们对财产权的实际尊重程度，似乎依赖于一些与道德无关的事实。这一困难在自由意志主义的财产权解释中，表现为初始占有问题。即便在理论上，土地这样的无主资源如何得以变成私人财产，也远非明白清楚。
Even if one accepts an account, such as that of Locke, of how initial acquisition might justly have occurred, that account provides little justification for the existing pattern of property rights, given the high probability that any piece of property has been unjustly seized at least once since it was first cleared. Yet billions of people, now and in the past, base much of their behavior on respect for property claims that seem either morally arbitrary or clearly unjust.
即使一个人接受某种如洛克那样的关于初始占有如何可能正当发生的解释，这种解释也很难给现存的财产权形式提供辩护，因为任何财产，在成为私产之后，都有很大可能被非正当地僭取过至少一次。但是古今数十亿人的多数行为，仍旧出于这一基础：尊重那些要么是道德上武断，要么是明显不义的权利主张。
A further difficulty with legal accounts of rights is that they are to some degree circular. We observe that police will act in certain ways and that their action (and related actions by judges, juries, etc.) implies that certain people have certain rights. But the behavior of police is itself in part a consequence of rights—such as the right of the state to collect taxes and pay them to the police as wages and the property right that the police then have over the money they receive.
权利的法律解释的另一个问题是，他们在某种程度上是循环论证。我们观察到警察按照确定方式行动，他们的行动（及法官、陪审团等的相关行动）表明某些人有某些权利。但是警察的行为本身就是权利的结果的一部分——比如政府收税发给警察作工资的权利，和警察对于他们收到的金钱的财产权。
For all of these reasons, I believe it is worth attempting a positive account of rights—an account which is both amoral and alegal. In part I of this essay I present such an account—one in which rights, in particular property rights, are a consequence of strategic behavior and may exist with no moral or legal support.
出于以上所有原因，我认为尝试一种关于权利的实证解释——一种既非道德也非法律的解释——是值得的。在本文的第一部分我将提出这一解释——其中权利，尤其财产权，是策略性行为的结果，无须道德或法律支持。
The account is presented both as an explanation of how rights could arise in a Hobbesian anarchy and as an explanation of the nature of rights as we observe them around us. In Part II I suggest ways in which something like the present structure of rights might have developed.
此解释既可以用来说明在霍布斯式的无政府世界里权利如何产生，又可以用来说明我们日常观察到的权利的性质。在第二部分，我会提出像现存权利体系这种事物得以发展出来的几种可能路径。
One puzzling feature of rights as we observe them is the degree to which the same conclusions seem to follow from very different assumptions. Thus roughly similar structures of rights can be and are deduced by libertarian philosophers trying to show what set of natural rights is just and by economists trying to show what set of legal rules would be efficient.
我们观察到的权利有一个令人困惑的特征：基于不同的假设似乎可以得出一样的结论。自由意志主义哲学家试图证明哪套自然权利是正义的；而经济学家则试图证明哪套法律规则是有效率的；二者可能并且已经推演出大致相似的权利架构。
And the structures of rights that they deduce seem similar to those observed in human behavior and embodied in the common law. In Part III of this essay I will try to suggest at least partial explanations for this triple coincidence—the apparent similarity between what is, what is just, and what is efficient.
而他们推演出的这套权利架构似乎与我们在人类行为中观察到的也相去不远，在普通法（common law）中亦有体现。在文章第三部分，我会试图对这种三重巧合——“实然”“应然”和“有效率”三者之间的明显相似，至少提出部分解释。
Part I: Schelling Points, Self-Enforcing Contracts, and the Paradox of Order
第一部分：谢林点，自执行契约和秩序悖论
Several writers have tried to analyze the transition from a Hobbesian state of nature to a state of civil order in terms of a set of hypothetical contracts establishing an initial distribution of property rights based on a preexisting distribution of power. One difficulty with this approach is that in the initial situation there are no institutions to enforce contracts. How can people in that situation change it by making contracts which are unenforceable and so of no effect?
一些作家曾尝试用一套基于既存权力分布而确定初始财产权分布的假想契约，来分析从霍布斯自然状态到文明秩序状态的过渡。这种方法的一个难点是，初始状况下没有强制执行契约的制度。人们又如何能通过订立无法强制执行、因而无效的契约，来改变现有状况呢？
The same problem can be seen from the other side by asking in what sense we, or any society, are ever out of a Hobbesian state of nature. What do we have, what have we created, that does not exist in the Hobbesian jungle?
这一问题当我们从另一个方向上追问时同样可以看到：我们，或任何社会，到底在何种意义上已经走出霍布斯自然状态呢？我们拥有或创造了什么在霍布斯丛林中并不存在的东西呢？
Civil order is not defined by the existence of physical objects—court rooms, police uniforms, law books. We can easily enough imagine a Hobbesian jungle—in the middle of a war, say—coexisting with all the physical appurtenances of civil society. And primitive peoples, without court rooms or law books, nonetheless live in a state of civil order.
文明秩序并不是按照法庭，警服，法律书等物理对象的存在而定义的。我们很容易想象一个拥有一切文明社会物质构件的霍布斯丛林，例如战争时期。而（同样可以想象）一个原始人群体，尽管没有法庭或法律典籍，却生活在文明秩序状态之中。
Nor does it suffice to say that we are in a state of civil order because we have judges to interpret our laws and police to enforce them. Why do those people act in that way? Presumably because it is in their private interest to do so—just as potential criminals obey the law for the same reason. But that is how people act in the Hobbesian jungle.
仅仅因为我们有法官来阐释法律，警察来执行法律，就说我们处于文明秩序状态之中，理由也是不充分的。法官和警察为何要按照此种方式行动？或许是因为这么做符合他们的私人利益——就好像潜在罪犯也出于同一理由而遵守法律。但这正是人们处于霍布斯丛林时的做法。
There too, one man may happen to enforce a rule, and another happen to obey it, because each finds it in his own interest to do so. What is it that we have and the Hobbesian jungle does not have that makes it in the interest of people to behave in a law abiding and peaceful manner? To say that the answer is “police, courts, government” only throws the question back a step; if civil order is enforced by men with guns, what controls them?
在那里，同样地，一个人碰巧执行一条规则，另一个人碰巧遵守它，正因为他们俩都觉得这样做符合个人利益。我们有而霍布斯丛林没有的是一种什么东西，能够使整个社会从全体的利益出发，遵守法律而和平相处呢？回答“警察，法庭和政府”只能把问题往前推进一步；如果文明秩序是靠手里有枪的人强制施行的，那么谁控制这些有枪的人呢？
There are two sorts of answers to these questions. One is that the difference is a moral one. People somehow accept an obligation, agree not to behave according to simple self interest, feel themselves bound by that agreement and alter their actions accordingly.
这些问题有两类答案。其一认为区别是道德上的。不知何故，人们了接受了一项义务，同意不仅仅依照个人利益行事，认识到自己受该协定的约束，并依此调整自己的行为。
There are difficulties with this sort of explanation. First, there is the empirical observation that people do not feel themselves bound to obey laws; many, perhaps most, people feel free to violate those laws (speed limits, drinking laws, customs regulations) which they disagree with and believe they can get away with breaking.
这类解释有一些难点。首先，有经验观察发现，人们并不觉得自己有义务遵守法律；很多人，也许是大多数人，当他们不认同某项法律（比如限速，饮酒法律，海关规定），并且相信自己能够逃脱惩罚时，就会随意违反这些法律。
Second, to the extent that people do feel a moral obligation to obey social rules, it is hard to derive that feeling from any variant of social contract theory. The traditional variants encounter the difficulty eloquently described by Lysander Spooner; since we ourselves did not sign the contract we are not bound by it.
第二，即便在人们觉得自己有道德义务去遵守社会准则时，这种道德感也很难从任何版本的社会契约论中推导出来。传统的社会契约论版本都面临Lysander Spooner曾有力陈述过的困难：我们自己没有签订过契约，所以不受其约束。
The difficulties with deriving moral obligation from the sort of pairwise social contract suggested by Winston Bush are equally great. Even if we consider that each of us is, at every instant, in an implicit contract with each of his neighbors to respect some agreed upon set of rights, still that contract, in Bush’s model, is based on the threat of coercion. It has no more moral legitimacy, according to conventional moral ideas, than the obligation to pay off a protection racket.
从Winston Bush提出的两两契约之类的理论推导出道德义务，也一样困难重重。即便设想，在Bush的模型之中，我们每个人在每一时刻，都和每个旁人处于一种隐性契约之中，约定尊重某一套协商好的权利，这种契约仍然是基于威胁使用强制手段的。依照传统的道德观念，其中所含的道德合法性并不比交保护费义务中所含的要多。
It may be possible to explain the difference between a Hobbesian state of nature and civil society as a moral difference, but I prefer the alternative explanation—that the essential difference is not in the motivation of the players but in the strategic situation they face. This raises the question of how making an agreement—in a society with no mechanisms for enforcing agreements—can change anything, the strategic situation included.
霍布斯自然状态和文明社会之间的区别，或许可以解释为一种道德区别，但我更喜欢另一种解释——其中本质区别不在于参与者的动机，而在于他们面临的策略处境。于是问题来了：在没有机制可以强制执行约定的社会，订下合约又能改变什么呢？包括，能改变他们面临的策略处境么？
I. A. The Tool: Schelling Points
第一部分之一，工具：谢林点
Two people are separately confronted with the list of numbers shown above and offered a reward if they independently choose the same number. If the two are mathematicians, it is likely that they will both choose 2—the only even prime. Non-mathematicians are likely to choose 100—a number which seems, to the mathematicians, no more unique than the other two exact squares. Illiterates might agree on 69, because of its peculiar symmetry—as would, for a different reason, those whose interest in numbers is more prurient than mathematical.
向两个人分别出示以下数列：2,5,9,25,69,73,82,96,100,126,150。如果两人独立选择了同一数字就给予奖励。如果二人是数学家，他们有可能都选2——唯一的偶质数。非数学家们可能选择100——一个在数学家们看来和另外两个平方数并无区别的数字。文盲可能同时选69，出于它奇特的对称——那些对于数字的兴趣主要在色情而非数学的人，出于另一种理由，也可能选择69。
There are three things worth noting about this simple problem in coordination without communication. The first is that each pair of players is looking for a number that is in some way unique. To a mathematician, all three squares are special numbers, as are the three primes. But if they try to coordinate on a square or a prime, they have only one chance in three of success—and besides, one may be trying primes and the other squares. 2 is unique. If the set of numbers did not contain 2 but did contain only one prime (or only one square, or one perfect number) they would choose that.
这个简单的无交流协调问题有三点值得注意。第一是，每一对参与者都在找一个以某种方式看独特的数字。对于数学家，三个平方数都特别，三个质数也是。但如果他们协同选择一个平方数或质数，他们只有三分之一的成功机会——何况还可能一个人选质数而另一个选了平方数。2则是独一无二的。如果这列数字里不包含2，但只包含一个质数（或一个平方数，或一个完全数），他们就会选这个数。
The second thing to note is that there is no single right answer; the number chosen by one player, and hence the number that ought to be chosen by the other, depends on the categories that the person choosing uses to classify the alternatives. The right strategy is to find some classification in terms of which there is a unique number, then choose that number—a strategy whose implementation depends on the particular classifications that pair of players uses. Thus the right answer depends on subjective characteristics of the players.
第二点值得注意的是，这里没有唯一的正确答案；一人选中并且也应当被另一人选中的那个数字，取决于前者所用的分类方法。正确的策略是找出一种产生独一无二数字的分类，然后选择此数字——这种策略的实施取决于两个参与者选择的特定分类方法。因此正确答案也取决于参与者的主观特性。
The third point, which follows from this, is that it is possible to succeed in the game because of, not in spite of, the bounded rationality of the players. To a mind of sufficient scope every number is unique. It is only because the players are limited to a small number of the possible classification schemes for numbers, and because the two players may be limited to the same schemes, that a correct choice may exist.
第三点是，由此可知，在这一博弈中取得成功之所以可能，不是由于参与者克服了自己的有限理性，而正是由于他们只拥有有限理性。对于一个充分理性的头脑，每一个数字都是独特的。正因为参与者受限于少量几种可能的数字分类方法，并且两人或许受限于同样的几种，正确的选择才可能存在。
In this respect the theory of this game is radically different from conventional game theory, which assumes players with unlimited ability to examine alternatives and so abstracts away from all subjective characteristics of the players except those embodied in their utility functions.
从这个角度来看，这种博弈的理论和传统博弈论极为不同，后者假设参与者有无限的能力去考虑备选项，因此除体现于效用函数中的那些之外，它剥离了参与者其它所有主观特性。
Consider now two players playing the game called bilateral monopoly. They have a dollar to divide between them, provided they can agree how to divide it. Superficially there is no resemblance between this game and that discussed above; the players are free to talk with each other as much as they want.
现在设想两个参与者在玩一个叫“双边垄断”（bilateral monopoly）的游戏。如果能就如何分配达成同意的话，他们就可以瓜分一块钱。表面上看，这和之前讨论的博弈一点也不像：参与者只要愿意就可以和对方自由交谈。
But while they can talk freely, there is a sense in which they cannot communicate at all. It is in my interest to persuade you that I will only be satisfied with a large fraction of the dollar; if I am really unwilling to accept anything less than ninety cents, you are better off agreeing to accept ten cents than holding out for more and getting nothing. Since it is in the interest of each of us to persuade the other of his resolve, all statements to that effect can be ignored; they would be made whether true or not.
可即便他们可以自由交谈，从一种意义上说，他们仍是完全无法沟通的：我的利益所在，是劝说你接受，我只有得到这块钱中的大头才会满足；如果我真的不愿接受少于九毛，那么你同意接受一毛比要求更多却一分都没拿到更好。因为向对方展示决心对自己有利，所有表达此种意思的言论都可以忽略，因为无论真假双方都会做这样的声明。
What each player has to do is to guess what the other’s real demand is, what the fraction of the dollar is without which he will refuse to agree. That cannot be communicated, simply because it pays each player to lie about it. The situation is therefore similar to that in the previous game; the players must coordinate their demands (so that they add up to a dollar) without communication. It seems likely that they will do so by agreeing to split the dollar fifty-fifty.
每个参与者必须要做的，是猜测对方的真实需求，即，少于几毛钱对方一定会拒绝同意。而这不可能付诸沟通，因为每人说谎对自己都有利。所以这个场景和上一个游戏类似；参与者必须在无法沟通的前提下协同他们的需求（使得总和是一块钱）。他们有可能会同意五五分成。
The same points made about the previous game apply here, although less obviously. The players are looking for a unique solution; if I decide that the natural split is one third-two thirds and you agree, both of us reasoning from a mystic belief in the significance of the number three, there is still the risk that each will decide he is entitled to the two-thirds.
关于头一个游戏的论点在此同样有效，尽管不如之前的明显。参与者们也在寻找一个独一无二的答案；如果我断定1/3和2/3是自然的分割，基于我们对于数字三的某种共同的神秘信仰，你也表示同意，但我们依旧有无法达成一致的风险，因为可能每个人都觉得自己应得2/3。
To see that the solution depends on the particular categories used by the players, imagine that both have been brought up to believe that utility, not money, is the relevant payoff, and suppose further that both believe the marginal utility of a dollar to be inversely proportional to the recipient’s income. In that case, the solution to the game is not a fifty-fifty split of money but a fifty-fifty split of utility—implying a division of the dollar into shares proportional to the two players’ incomes.
为了看清答案依赖于参与者们特有的分类方式，请想象两人的成长环境都让他们认为效用而非金钱才是被看重的回报；同时假设两人都认为一块钱的边际效用和受惠者的收入成反比。在这种情况下，博弈解不再是金钱的对半分成，而是效用的对半分成——意即一块钱被分成和两个参与者收入成比例的两部分。
Such an outcome, chosen because of its uniqueness, is called a Schelling point, after Thomas Schelling who originated the idea. It provides a possible solution to the problem of coordination without communication. As this example shows, it is relevant both to situations where communication is physically impossible and to situations where communication is impossible because there is no way that either party can provide the other with a reason to believe that what he says is true.
这种因其唯一性而被选中的结果，叫做谢林点，得名于提出这一观点的托马斯·谢林（Thomas Schelling）。这给无沟通协调问题提供了一个可能的解答。正如这个例子所表明的，即便交流在物理上不可能发生，或是交流可以发生但是双方都拿不出理由让对方相信自己所说为真时，协调同样能起作用。
Even if it is impossible for the players in such a game to communicate their real demands, it may still be possible for them to affect the outcome by what they say. They could do so, not by directly communicating their own strategies (any such statement will be disbelieved), but by altering the other player’s categories, the ways in which he organizes the alternatives of the game, and so changing the Schelling points which depend on those categories.
即使在这个博弈中参与者无法交流他们的真实需求，他们仍然可能通过言语影响结果。做到这一点，需直接交流自己的他们不策略（这样的话说了也没人相信），而会去试图改变对方的分类方式，即对方为博弈构造不同备选项的方式，从而改变依赖于这些分类的谢林点。
In the example just discussed, for example, one player (presumably the richer) might remind the other of their shared belief in the importance of utility in order to make sure the equi-utility Schelling point would be chosen. If, in the first game I described, the players were allowed to talk before seeing the numbers, a conversation on the interesting properties of primes or the special uniqueness of the lowest of a series of numbers might well alter the Schelling point, and so the result of the game. One can interpret a good deal of bargaining behaviour in this light—as an attempt by one party to make the other see the situation in a particular way, so as to generate a Schelling point favorable to the first party.
在上述例子中，一个参与者（比如说更有钱的那个）可能提醒对方，两人都相信效用的重要性，试图保证同效用（equi-utility）谢林点被选中。假如在第一个博弈中，参与者在看到数字之前可以交谈，那么关于质数的有趣特征或是关于数列中最小值的特别之处的谈话，很可能会改变谢林点，进而改变博弈结果。人们可以如此解释很大一部分议价行为——它就是一方尝试让另一方用某种特定眼光看待当前场景，以便产生一个对自己有利的谢林点。
A slightly different way in which one may conceptualize the process of agreement on a Schelling point is in terms of bargaining costs in a context of continuous bargaining. Consider a situation in which the number of possible outcomes is very large. Suppose the process of bargaining is itself costly, either because it consumes time or because each player bears costs (such as staying out on strike) in trying to validate his threats. As long as the players are faced with a choice among a large number of comparable alternatives, each proposal by one player is likely to call forth a competing proposal from another, slanted a little more in his own interest.
概念化地理解协议达致谢林点的过程，还有个稍微不同的方式：那就是考虑持续议价情境中的议价成本。设想一个情境之中，可能的结果选项非常多。假设议价过程本身是有成本的，这或者是因为花费时间，或者是因为参与者证实自己的威胁需要成本（比如罢工）。只要参与者需要从很多备选项中做出选择，那么一个参与者提出的每个建议都很可能促使对方提出一个竞争性的选项，使之稍微向己方利益倾斜。
But suppose there is one outcome that is seen as unique. A player who proposes that outcome may be perceived as offering, not a choice between that outcome, another slightly different, another different still, … but a choice between that outcome and continued bargaining.
但假设有一个结果被认为是特殊的。那么一方提议这个结果，就可能被视为提出了一个“要么就这个结果”要么就“继续议价”的选择，而非那种你提一个我再提一个稍微不同的，你再提个又有所不同的……的情况。
A player who says that he insists on the unique outcome and will not settle for anything less may be believable, where a similar statement about a different outcome would not be. He can convincingly argue that he will stand by his proposed outcome because, once he gives it up, he has no idea where he will end up or how high the costs of getting there will be.
一个说自己坚持要该独特结果而不会屈就的参与者，可能是可信的；而换个结果，同样的声明则不可信。此人可以论证说，他会坚持自己提议的结果，因为一旦放弃，他就完全不知道自己的结局会怎样，也不知道到达该结局之前的议价成本会有多高。这种论证能够让人信服。，
In order for a Schelling point to provide a peaceful resolution to a conflict of interest, both parties must conceptualize the alternatives in similar ways—similar enough so that they can agree about which possible outcomes are unique, and thus attractive as potential Schelling points.
为让谢林点能够于利益冲突之中提供和平解决方案，双方必须能用类似的方式去考虑备选项——类似到双方能够同意什么结果是独特的，因而有足够吸引力而可能成为谢林点。
So one interesting implication of the argument is that violent conflict is especially likely to occur on the boundary between cultures, where people with very different ways of viewing the world interact.
所以这一论证的一个有趣结论是：暴力冲突尤其可能在不同文化的边界发生，在那里，遭遇双方具有截然不同的世界观。
I. B. Up From Hobbes
第一部分之二，跳出霍布斯状态
Two people are living in a Hobbesian state of nature. Each can injure or steal from the other, at some cost, and each can spend resources on his own defense. Since conflict consumes resources, both could benefit by agreeing on what each owns and thereafter each respecting the other’s property.
两人生活在霍布斯自然状态中。每人都可以以一定成本伤害或者窃取对方，也可以花费资源来增强个人防卫。因为冲突消耗资源，所以通过协议确定谁拥有什么，继而尊重对方的财产权，二者均可获益。
The joint benefit might be divided in different ways, according to the particular set of property rights they agree on—what property belongs to whom, and whether either has a property right in tribute from the other. This is a special case of the game—bilateral monopoly—described above.
根据他们约定的不同财产权组合，这一共同利益也有不同的分割方法——谁拥有哪些财产，一方是否拥有从对方那里索取贡奉的财产权。这是上述“双边垄断”博弈的一种特殊形式。
Each player, of course, will threaten to refuse to make any such agreement unless he gets the division he wants. Each will disbelieve most of the other’s threats. If their ability to coerce and defend is roughly equal, and if there is some natural division of contested property (such as a stream running between their farms), it is likely that they will find a Schelling point in the form of an agreement to accept that division, respect each other’s rights, and pay no tribute.
每个参与者当然会威胁拒绝任何此类协定——除非他得到自己想要的分额。每个人都会拒绝相信对方的大部分威胁。如果他们的胁迫和自卫能力大抵相当，而且争议财产有某种自然分割（比如他们各自农地之间有一条溪流），那么他们就有可能找到一个谢林点：其表现就是他们订立一个协定，接受这种分割，尊重彼此的权利并且贡奉无须纳贡。
If one (being, perhaps, slightly more powerful) tries to insist on a small tribute, arguing that it will still leave the other better off than continued conflict, the other may believably refuse, arguing that once he concedes any tribute there is no natural limit to what the other can demand.
如果一人（也许是稍微强壮的那个）试图要求一小部分贡奉，争辩说，即便如此对方的状况也会比继续冲突要好；那么对方能够可信地拒绝，其理由可以是，一旦他同意交纳任何贡奉，对方索求就没有一个自然上限。
Agreeing to tribute costs the victim not only the tribute but the only available Schelling point. The expected cost to him of such an agreement includes both the possible cost of paying higher tribute in the future and the risk of future conflicts if in the future he rejects demands for higher tribute. That cost may be high enough to make his insistence that he will choose continued conflict over the payment of even a small tribute believable.
对于受害者来说，同意纳贡不仅花费贡奉本身，还令其失去了仅有的谢林点。对他来说，这个协定的预期成本不仅包括未来可能支付的更多贡奉，还包括一旦未来拒绝更多贡奉所带来的冲突风险。这种成本可能足够高，足以使得他的这种宁愿选择延续冲突也不会支付哪怕是少许贡奉的坚持是可信的。
So far we have considered the Schelling point that generates an agreement. But the agreement itself, whether generated by a Schelling point or in some other way, is thereafter itself a Schelling point. It is a unique outcome of which both players are conscious. Once it has been made, a policy of “if you do not abide by the agreement I will revert to the use of force, even if the violation is small compared to the cost of conflict” is believable for precisely the same reason the refusal to pay tribute, or any insistence by a bargainer on a Schelling point, is believable. The signing of a contract establishes a new Schelling point and thereby alters the strategic situation. The contract enforces itself.
到此为止，我们考虑的是促成协定的谢林点。然而这一协定，无论是源于谢林点或别的什么，在此之后本身也成了谢林点。这是一个双方都知道的独特结果。一旦它得以确立，一种“你不遵守协定我就回归使用武力，哪怕毁约所害比冲突的代价要小”的策略就是可信的，正如拒绝纳贡，或任何对于谢林点的坚持是可信的一样。签订契约建立了新的谢林点，进而改变了策略场景。这种契约能够自我强制执行。
This applies not only to the initial pairwise social contract but to subsequent contracts as well. Suppose you have an orchard and I have an axe. After agreeing on our mutual property rights, you offer me a bushel of apples to cut down a tree that is shading your orchard. I cut down the tree as agreed, but you refuse to give me the apples. What happens?
以上论述不仅适用于初始的双边社会契约，也适用于后继的契约。假设你有一个果园而我有一把斧头。在我们确定了各自的财产权之后，你答应给我一蒲式耳苹果，换取我砍倒一棵遮挡你果园阳光的树。我依照协议砍倒了树，你却拒绝给我苹果。接下来怎么办呢？
So far as our physical situation is concerned, I am in no more able to compel you to pay me a bushel of apples now than I was before you made the offer and I cut down the tree—our material resources, our ability to hurt each other and defend ourselves, are the same as they were.
就我们的物质状况来说，和你提出该建议然后我把树砍倒之前相比，现在我强迫你给我一蒲式耳苹果的能力并没有增加——我们的物质资源，我们伤害对方和保护自己的能力，都和之前一样。
Yet my threat to cut down your orchard unless you pay up is more credible than it would have been before, both because I have more reason to carry through on it and because you have less reason to resist it. Before, the attempt to get a bushel of apples from you would have been an attempt to move you away from the Schelling point established by the initial contract. Now it is an attempt to restore the Schelling point established by our subsequent agreement.
但是假设你不如约支付的话我就要砍倒你的果树，这个威胁会比之前更加可信；因为不仅我更有理由执行它，而且你也更少理由抗拒它。在（订立上述契约）之前，从你手中拿走一蒲式耳苹果，是一个试图使你偏离由该初始契约所确立的谢林点的行为。而现在，我（砍倒你果树）的行为，则是一个试图恢复由该契约所确立的谢林点的行为。
A more conventional explanation of this is that the reason it is in your interest to deliver the apples once you have agreed to do so is that you wish to establish a reputation for keeping promises, and that the reason it is in my interest to punish you if you do not deliver the apples is because I wish to establish a reputation for enforcing contracts made with me. While this may be true, there are two reasons why it cannot be a complete explanation.
对于这种情况的一个更通常的解释是：你依约交出苹果之所以符合你的利益，乃是因为你想建立一个守信的名声；而如果你不交出苹果我就要惩罚你，这之所以符合我的利益，乃是因为我想建立一个与我签订的契约会得到强制执行的名声。这也许是真的，但是有两个理由告诉我们，这不是一个完备的解释。
First, it depends on a particular perception of consistent behavior—in pure logic, there is no more reason to think of “always enforce” as more consistent then “back down the first, third, fifth, … time and fight the second, fourth, ….” Both describe single possible strategies. The important difference between them is that the former is a Schelling point and the latter is not— a fact not about the strategies but about the way we classify them.
首先，这取决于对行为一致性的某种特殊理解——纯逻辑来说，“永远强制执行”并不比“第一三五次退缩、第二四六次对抗”更一致。二者都是单一可能性策略。两者之间的重要区别是，前者是谢林点而后者不是——一个无关于策略本身，而是关乎于我们如何对策略进行分类的事实。
A second and related problem with the conventional account is that I might equally well wish to establish a reputation for following through on extortionary demands. We need some way of explaining why I cut down the shade tree first, instead of simply committing myself to demand your apples. If the former pattern creates a Schelling point of contract fulfillment and the latter does not, that provides a possible explanation.
传统解释的第二个问题（与第一个不无关系）是，我有同等的可能性，想要建立一种坚持实现勒索性要求的名声。我们需要某种方法来解释，为什么我会把遮阳的树砍倒，而不是直接强行索取你的苹果。如果前一个行为模式建立了一个履行协约的谢林点，而后者不能，那这就是一个可能的解释。
I believe I have now resolved the apparent paradox of contracting out of the Hobbesian jungle. The process of contracting changes the situation because it establishes new Schelling points, which in turn affect the strategic situation and its outcome. The same analysis can be used from the other side to explain what constitutes civil society. The laws and customs of civil society are an elaborate network of Schelling points.
我相信我现在已经解决了通过建立契约脱离霍布斯丛林的表面悖论。建立契约的过程能够改变情境，正因为它建立了新的谢林点；后者继而影响了策略场景及其结果。另一方面，同样的分析也可以用来解释文明社会如何构成。文明社会的法律和习俗组成了一个复杂精密的谢林点网络。
If my neighbor annoys me by growing ugly flowers, I do nothing. If he dumps his garbage on my lawn, I retaliate—possibly in kind. If he threatens to dump garbage on my lawn, or play a trumpet fanfare at 3 A.M. every morning, unless I pay him a modest tribute I refuse—even if I am convinced that the available legal defenses cost more than the tribute he is demanding.
如果我的邻居种了难看的花来烦我，我啥也不做。如果他把垃圾倒在我的草坪上，我就会反击——很可能把垃圾倒回去。如果他威胁要把垃圾倒在我的草坪上，或者要在每天凌晨三点大声吹号，除非我给他一点贡奉，那么我就会拒绝——即使我确信所需的法律诉讼成本要比他要的那点贡奉还多。
If a policeman arrests me—even for a crime I did not commit—I go along peacefully. If he tries to rob my house, I fight, even if the cost of doing so is more than the direct cost of letting him rob me.
如果警察要逮捕我——即使我没犯所控罪名——我也会平静配合。如果他企图抢劫我的家，我就反抗——即使这样做的成本比让他抢我的直接成本还高。
Each of us knows what behavior by everyone else is within the rules and what behaviour implies unlimited demands, the violation of the Schelling point, and the ultimate return to the Hobbesian jungle. The latter behaviour is prevented by the threat of conflict even if (as in the British defense of the Falklands) the direct costs of surrender are much lower than the direct costs of conflict.
我们每人都知道，别人什么行为是符合规则的，什么行为隐含着无限制的索求，而什么行为是对谢林点的违反，什么则是对霍布斯丛林的终极回归。最后一种情况之所以得以防止，是因为存在战斗威慑，即便投降的直接成本比战斗的直接成本低很多（比如英国保卫福克兰群岛）。
One question this raises is how we succeed in committing ourselves not to back down in such situations. One answer has been suggested already. It is in my long run interest not to back down because if I do I can expect further demands: “if once you have paid him the danegeld/You never get rid of the Dane.”
由此引发的一个问题是，我们如何保证自己在这种场景中不会退缩。一个答案上文已经提及了。不退缩符合我的长期利益，因为一旦退缩我就可能面临更多索求——“一旦你交了丹麦金，就永远摆脱不了丹麦人。”【译注：丹麦金是9世纪到11世纪之间西欧受丹麦入侵者频繁劫掠的地区（特别是英格兰东南和布列塔尼），当地政府向居民征收用以向入侵者支付贡奉以免遭劫掠的一种特别税。】
This explanation is not entirely adequate. In some situations, the aggressor may be able to commit himself to keep your surrender secret and limit his own demands. In others, the short run costs of resistance may be larger than the long run costs of surrender.
这并不足以解释所有的情况。在某些场景中，侵略者可能会承诺保守你投降的秘密，并限制他自身的索求。另一些场景中，抵抗带来的短期成本也许高于投降并纳贡所带来的长期成本。
People (and nations) do sometimes surrender to such demands. If they do so less often then a simple calculation of costs and benefits might predict, the explanation may be found in a class of arguments made by Robert Frank and others.
人们（和国家）有时候会向这种索求投降。如果他们这样做的频率低于简单的收益成本分析所得出的结果，那么或许可以从Robert Frank等人提出的一类论证中找到解释。
The central insight of such arguments is that even if surrender is sometimes in my private interest, being the sort of person who will surrender when it is in his interest to do so may not be, since if it is known that I will not back down there is no point in making the initial demand. My first best option is to pretend to be tough, in the hope that the demand will not be made, while reserving the option of surrendering if my bluff is called.
此类论证的核心思想是，即便投降有时符合我的个人利益，做一个“符合个人利益时就投降”的人并不符合我的利益；因为如果人尽皆知我不会退缩，那么一开始就没理由提出索求。我的最优选择是装作强硬，期望不会有人提出索求，同时保留虚张声势被戳穿后投降的选择。
If, however, humans are imperfectly able to lie to each other about what sort of people they are—as seems to be the case—then the best available option may be to really be tough, despite the risk that I will occasionally find myself forced to fight when I would be better off surrendering.
但是如果人类对于自己是什么样的人并没有完美的撒谎能力——事实好像正是如此——那么最优选择也许是真正强硬，尽管这样做的话，就得冒这样的风险：有时投降更有利，但我却不得不战斗。
None of this argument depends on moral sanctions. I may (indeed do) believe that the tax collector is morally equivalent to the thief. I accept one and fight the other because of my beliefs about other people’s behaviour—what they will or will not fight for—and because there are beliefs about my behaviour which I wish others to hold. We are bound together by a set of mutually reinforcing strategic expectations.
这些论证都不依赖于道德约束。我可能（其实就是）认为税官和窃贼在道德上没有区别。我接受其中一个而反抗另一个，是基于我对他人行为的信念——他们会（或不会）为何物而抗争——也基于我希望别人对我的行为能持有某种信念。我们被一套相互强化的策略期望束缚在一起。
Part II: Two Routes from Hobbes to Here
第二部分：从霍布斯到当今秩序的两种途径
My argument so far has dealt with two ends of an extended process. I started with an explanation of how it was possible, in a two person world, to take the first steps towards bargaining out of a Hobbesian state of nature. I ended with an explanation of how the same logic maintains civil order as we know it. Missing is any explanation of the intermediate steps by which the complicated and functional order in which we live might have been constructed.
到现在为止，我的论述集中在这个漫长过程的两端。一开始我解释了，在一个两人世界中，跨出通过议价而脱离霍布斯自然状态的第一步，何以是可能的。在结尾我解释了，同样的逻辑如何维持我们所了解的文明秩序。其中缺少的是，我们生活于其中的复杂功能秩序，是如何构建出来的，即对中间步骤的解释。
One possibility is legislation. If an important part of the way in which individuals classify actions is “legal/illegal,” then the fact of legal change, whether by a king, legislature, or court system, changes the way in which they classify the alternatives, which in turn changes the set of Schelling points.
一种可能解释是立法。如果个人对行为的一个重要分类是“合法/非法”，那么无论是国王、立法者还是法院系统带来的法律变化，都会改变人们对备选项进行分类的方式，继而改变谢林点集合。
If the court has recognized property rights in water but not in air, I classify pollution of my section of the river as aggression and fight it, by legal, social, or even illegal means. I classify pollution of my air by my neighbor’s soap factory as an inconvenient nuisance and either put up with it or try to buy him off. Under these circumstances legislation is, to a considerable degree, self-enforcing; the pattern of property rights might well survive even if the enforcement arm of the state vanished or became impotent.
如果法院认可对于水的财产权，而不认可对于空气的财产权，那么我就把针对我的河流段的污染看作是入侵，进而通过法律的、社会的、甚至非法手段进行抗争。而我把周边空气受到邻居肥皂厂的污染当作一个不便的日常琐事，或者忍了或者给钱让他不要再排污了。在这些情况下，立法在某种程度上是自我执行的；即使政府的强制执行机器消失或者变得无能了，这种财产权模式也很可能延续下去。
While this may be part of the explanation for civil order, it cannot be all of it, for at least three reasons. First, some rights have no legal rules associated with them. Second, many, perhaps most, people are selective about which legal rules they take seriously—as can easily be observed on any U.S. highway. And finally, there are well documented situations in which property rights exist and are respected even though they are inconsistent with the relevant legal rights.
尽管这也许能部分解释文明秩序，至少有三种原因使它不可能是全部的解释。第一，有些权利没有相关的法律规定。第二，很多人，或许是大部分人，只选择性的严肃对待一部分法规——在任何美国高速上都很容易看到。最后，即便和有关法规相悖，财产权仍然存在并受人们尊重，这种情形记录详多。
This final point brings up a second possible explanation of how the pattern of expectations might have come into existence—that it is due not to the creation of laws but to the evolution of norms. Robert Ellickson, in a recent book, describes how relations among neighbors function in Shasta County California.
最后一点提示了对于可能的模式如何成为现实的第二种可能解释——它的产生不基于法律的创制，而是基于规范的演化。Robert Ellickson在他最近的书中描述了在加州夏斯塔郡邻里关系是如何运作的。【编注：书名为 Order Without Law，中译本《无需法律的秩序》。】
One of his most striking observations was that in several cases, including conflicts over trespass by animals and the allocation of the cost of building fences between neighbors, the inhabitants ignore the relevant laws and act instead according to well understood non-legal norms.
他最令人惊讶的发现之一是，在一些情况下，包括动物擅闯和邻里分担建造篱笆成本这样的纠纷中，居民忽略了相关法律，而依照众所周知的非法律规范（non-legal norm）行事。
Ellickson offers no adequate account of how such norms develop or of why they provide, in some contexts but not in all, at least approximately efficient rules. A possible answer to that puzzle brings us back to the two person social contract discussed in the previous section.
至于这些规范如何发展出来，或者它们为何能够在某些而不是全部情境中提供至少近乎高效的规则，Ellickson没有提供足够的解释。对这个谜团的可能回答，将带我们回到上一部分讨论过的二人社会契约。
One might try to explain functional norms by evolution. Perhaps, over time, societies with better norms conquer, absorb, or are imitated by societies with worse norms, producing a world of well designed societies. The problem with that explanation is that such a process should take centuries, if not millennia—which does not fit the facts as Ellickson reports them. Whaling norms in the 19th century, for example, seem to have adjusted rapidly to changes in the species being hunted.
演化也许可以用来解释功能性规范。也许随着时间流逝，有更好规范的社群征服、吸收了有不好规范的社群，或被后者所模仿——这造就了一个充满设计良好的社群的世界。这种解释的问题是，此过程应该需要几个世纪，如果不是几千年的话——但这和Ellickson所报告的事实不符。举例来说，19世纪的捕鲸规范似乎随着被猎物种的变化而迅速调整了。
Perhaps what is happening is evolution, but evolution involving groups much smaller and more fluid than entire societies. Consider a norm, such as honesty, that can profitably be followed by small groups within a society, applicable only within the group. Groups with efficient norms will prosper and grow by recruitment. Others will imitate them. Groups with similar norms will tend to fuse, in order to obtain the same benefits on a larger scale.
也许其中发生的确是一种演化，不过演化所涉及的是比整个社群更小更有流动性的团体。请设想一种可以被社群中的小团体遵守且受益的规范，设想它仅仅适用于此种小团体内部。有高效规范的团体能够繁荣并且通过吸收新成员而扩张。其他团体会模仿此类团体。有类似规范的团体为了在更大规模上取得此种收益，会倾向于融合。
If one system of norms works better than its competitors, it will eventually spread through the entire society. When circumstances change and new problems arise the process can repeat itself on a smaller scale, generating modified norms to deal with the new problems. In effect, what we have is the pairwise contracting out of the Hobbesian state of nature, repeated many times between pairs and within small groups.
如果一套规范比另一套好，它最终会变遍布整个社群。如果情况变化，出现了新问题，整个过程可以在较小的规模上重复，产生出改良的规范来应对新问题。结果我们将看到，两两订立契约而脱离霍布斯自然状态这一过程，将在两两之间、和在小团体内反复发生。
This conjecture about how norms arise and change suggests a prediction: Even if a norm is efficient, it will not arise if its benefits depend on its being generally adopted. Suppose we define a norm as locally efficient if, with regard to any two individuals following the norm, there is no different norm such that at least one would be better off and the other no worse off if they both switched to it. A norm is globally efficient if there is no different norm such that at least one person would be better off and nobody worse off if everyone switched to it.
这个关于规范如何出现和如何变化的猜想暗含一个预测：即使一个规范是高效的，假如它的好处依赖于对它的普遍遵循，它也无法出现。让我们定义：对任意两个遵循某规范的个体来说，如果没有别的规范能够使两人在转而遵循它之后，其中至少一人情况变得更好，而另一人情况不会变差，那么此规范就是局部高效的（locally efficient）。如果没有别的规范能够使得所有人在转而遵循它之后，其中至少一人情况变得更好，而所有人都不会变差，那么这个规范是全局高效的（globally efficient）。
Consider the whaling norms that Ellickson discusses. It is in the interest of any pair of captains to agree in advance to an efficient rule for dealing with whales that one ship harpoons and another one brings in, just as it is in the interest of a pair of individuals to agree to be honest with each other.
设想Ellickson提到的捕鲸规范。任何两个船长，若能先行达成一条有效规则，解决一船射中而另外一船捕获的鲸鱼处理问题，那对双方都是有好处的；就像答应相互诚实对两人都有好处一样。
But a rule for holding down the total number of whales killed so as to preserve the population of whales is useful only if almost everyone follows it. The former type of norm existed, the latter did not—with the result that 19th century whalers did an efficient job of hunting one species after another to near extinction.
但是降低捕杀鲸的总数，从而保存鲸种群这种规则，只有所有人都遵守时才会有用。前面这种规范存在过，后者就没有——结果是19世纪捕鲸人高效的把一个又一个鲸种驱向灭绝。
So the evolution of norms provides a second possible account of how we get from Hobbes to here. Where the recognition of rights between two people, such as neighbors, or within a small group, provides mutual benefits, it is in the interest of the parties concerned to recognize such rights.
所以，规范的演化为我们如何能从霍布斯抵达当今秩序这一问题提出了另一种可能解释。当两人，比如邻居之间，或者小团体内部，同时承认彼此权利能带来共同好处时，对于相关各方来说，承认权利均符合其利益。
By doing so they change the pattern of Schelling points that determines the equilibrium of their interaction, in a way which provides (some) protection for the rights in question. Over a long period of time, the result is to create a set of consistent mutual expectations, and one that tends to be locally, although not necessarily globally, efficient.
他们这样做的时候就改变了谢林点的格局——后者决定着他们之间的互动均衡——，使之朝着为相关权利提供（某些）保护的方向变化。长此以往，结果是创造出一套一致的共同预期，而它即便不是全局高效，也往往是局部高效的。
III: Law, Justice, and Efficiency
第三部分：法律，正义和效率
In thinking about issues of rights, I find myself playing two quite different roles. As a human being and (like all human beings) an amateur philosopher, I have moral intuitions; from that standpoint, the question is “why ought one not to steal” and the answer is “because it is wicked.”
在思考权利问题的时候，我发现自己经常扮演两种迥异角色。作为人类一员和业余哲学家（就像所有人一样），我有道德直觉；从这个角度出发，问题是“为什么人不应该盗窃”，而答案是“因为这是邪恶的”。
As an economist I ask and answer different questions. One is “what are the consequences of people being free to steal.” Much of the economic analysis of law is devoted to answering questions of that sort. Another is “why do people (often) not steal?”
而作为经济学家，我提出和回答的是不同的问题。其中一个就是“如果允许自由偷窃，结果会怎样”。大部分关于法律的经济分析都致力于回答此类问题。另一个问题则是“为什么人们（一般）不偷窃？”
This essay is an attempt to answer that final sort of question. I have tried to answer the economist’s question about rights rather than the philosopher’s not because economics is more important than moral philosophy but because I am more confident in my ability to use economics to produce answers. I have been encouraged in this policy by a curious and convenient coincidence: in most cases, the rules I conclude to be efficient are also the rules I believe to be just.
这篇文章试图回答最后这种问题。我尝试回答关于权利的经济问题而不是哲学问题，不是因为经济学比道德哲学更重要，而是因为我对自己运用经济学回答问题的能力更有信心。鼓励我采用这一策略的是一种奇特而便利的巧合：在大多数场合中，我推演得出的高效规则，同样也被我认为是正义的。
It is not a double but a triple coincidence. The rules I believe to be efficient and just are also, to a significant degree, the rules enforced by the laws and norms of the society I live in. In this essay I have sketched some ideas about the nature of those rules and how they have evolved. This raises the question of why, if my account is correct, the rules produced in this way resemble those that I deduce to be efficient and intuit to be just.
这不是一个双重巧合，而是一个三重巧合。我认为是高效而且正义的规则，在很大程度上也是我所生活的那个社会的法律和规范所施行的规则。在这篇文章中我简单描述了这些规则的性质和它们是如何演化的。于是问题来了：如果我的解释是正确的，那么为什么这样产生的规则，和我推导为高效的规则，以及我在直觉上认为是正义的规则，是如此的相似呢？
In trying to answer that question, I find it useful to start by considering a class of property which underlies all other property and exists even in a Hobbesian state of nature.
试图回答这个问题的时候，我发现最好先从考虑作为所有其他财产基础的一类财产开始，这类财产甚至存在于霍布斯自然状态之中。
I can control the motions of my body by a simple act of will. You can control its motions by imposing overwhelming force, by making believable threats to which I will yield, or in various other ways. Controlling it may be possible for both of us, but it is much cheaper and easier for me. In this sense, we may describe my body as my natural property.
我凭借简单的意愿活动就可以控制我身体的动作。你想控制我身体的动作，必须通过做出可信的能屈服我的威胁，或者别的方法来施之强力。控制我的身体这件事，你我都可能做到，但是对我来说简单且便宜得多。在此意义上，我们可以把我的身体称作我的自然财产。
The same description applies to my gun—because I know where I hid it and you do not. Even land may be natural property to some extent if my detailed knowledge of the terrain makes it easier for me to use or defend it. Such property is natural inasmuch as my possession of it exists in the state of nature and is independent of social convention. The fact that I can control certain things more cheaply than you can is technology, not law or morals.
同样的描述也适用于我的枪——因为我知道我把它藏在哪里而你不知道。如果我对地形的详细了解使我更方便使用或者防卫一片土地，那么甚至土地在一定程度上也是自然财产。这样的财产之所以是自然的，是因为我对它的掌控发生于自然状态之中，并且独立于社会习俗。我能对特定的事物实施更低成本的控制这一事实，是种技术，而非法律或道德。
Natural property is a useful starting point for explaining the similarities among what is, what should be, and what would be efficient because it is relevant to all three.
解释“实然”、“应然”和“效率”这三者之间的相似之处，自然财产是一个有用的起点，因为它和三者都有关。
If the account I have offered is correct, our actual civil order is the result of extended bargaining, based ultimately on natural property. It was my control over my body that made the initial steps out of the state of nature possible. So natural property is relevant to what is—to the existing pattern of laws and norms.
如果我提出的解释是正确的，那么现实的政治秩序就是最终基于自然财产的长期议价的结果。正是我对于我身体的控制，使得脱离自然状态的最初几步变为可能。所以自然财产和“实然”这问题相关——即和现存的法律和社会规范模式相关。
In a world of no transaction costs, any initial allocation of property rights is efficient. In a world with positive transaction costs, the basis for choosing among alternative allocations is the cost of enforcing and changing them. A set of rules in which I own my body and you own yours is superior to one in which each owns the other’s body, or each has a half interest in each body, in part because it is so much easier to enforce. So we have a Coasian argument for the relevance of natural property to what is efficient.
在没有交易成本的世界，财产权的任何初始分配都是高效的。在交易成本为正的世界，选择不同分配形式的基础就是执行和改变它们的成本高低。我拥有我的身体而你拥有你身体这样一套规则，就比相互拥有对方身体的另一套规则优越，也比两人分别拥有两个身体的一半的规则优越。这在某种程度上是因为前者更好执行的多。所以，关于自然财产与效率问题的相关性，现在我们有了一个科斯式（Coasian）论证。
This argument also provides a second connection between natural property and what is. My earlier arguments suggest that the evolution of rules tends to move in a direction that is at least locally efficient. If so, and if rules that allocate natural property to its natural owner are efficient, we would expect to observe such rules. Put differently, the argument for local efficiency of evolved norms provides a reason for some similarity between the rules we observe and the rules that are efficient.
此论证也提供了关于自然财产和“实然”问题的第二个联系。我早先的论证表明，规则演化趋向于至少是局部高效的方向。如果情况是这样的，并且如果依照自然所有者分配自然财产的规则是高效的，那么我们就可以期望会观察到这样的规则。换种方法说，对于社会规范在演进过程中的局部高效性的论证，为现实中所见规则和高效规则之间的相似性，提供了一种说明。
What, if anything, does natural property have to do with what ought to be? That depends on what normative account one accepts. For those of us who accept a libertarian account, in which the underlying right is my right to own myself and whatever I have obtained by voluntary agreement with others who own it, the connection is immediate.
自然财产和“应然”问题又有什么关系呢？这就取决于我们接受哪一类规范性论述了。对于我们这些接受自由意志主义论述的人，根本性的权利就是，拥有自身的权利，和对经由自愿协定从其他拥有者处获取的任何事物的权利；对于我们来说这联系是直接的。
Self ownership is both a moral axiom and a technological fact. Voluntary exchange is both a morally legitimate way of altering the pattern of ownership and, if my account of bargaining from the state of nature is correct, a technologically possible way (although not necessarily the only such) of altering a Schelling point and thus an equilibrium.
自我所有权既是一个道德公理，又是一个技术事实。自愿交换既是道德上合法地改变所有权模式的方法，又是一种技术上可行（尽管不一定是唯一）的改变谢林点继而改变均衡的方法——如果我关于自然状态下议价的解释是正确的话。
We now have the beginning of an explanation of the similarity among actual rules, efficient rules, and just rules. The status of this explanation, and of the fact being explained, is not, however, the same for the relation between the first two as it is for the relation of either to the third.
我们现在有了一个关于现实规则、高效规则和正义规则之间相似性的初步解释。然而，对于前两者之间的关系，以及前两者中任一个之于第三者的关系来说，这一解释本身的地位，不同于被解释的事实的地位。
What rules exist can be observed and what rules are efficient can be deduced, at least in principle, from observed technologies and economic theory. Thus the claim that there is some correspondence between what exists and what is efficient is a positive rather than a normative claim.
什么规则实际存在，这能被观察到，而什么规则是高效的，则能（至少在原则上）从所观察到的技术和经济理论中推导得出。所以“实然”和“高效”两者有某种关系，这一断言是实证的而不是规范的。
What ought to be, on the other hand, is, at least in this essay, simply a description of my moral intuitions. If I conclude that the rules that would be just are similar to both the rules that exist and the rules that would be efficient, that may simply be evidence that my moral judgments are ex post rationalizations of the world I live in or the conclusions of my economic analysis.
另一方面，“应然”（至少在此文中）仅仅是对于我道德直觉的描述。如果我得出，正义规则和现实规则及高效规则这三者是相似的，这也许只说明我的道德判断不过是我对所生活世界的事后（ex post）合理化，或者只是我的经济分析的结论。
One further similarity between the ethics and the social order that I have been discussing is worth mentioning. Both are essentially decentralized. The ethical position makes no attempt to evaluate individuals from above—in terms of their worth in the eyes of God. It consists rather of a description of what obligations each individual has to each other individual. The social order, to the extent that it is evolved rather than legislated, is a set of rules that exist because it was in the interest of pairs of individuals to abide by them, not because they promote the general good of society.
我正讨论的伦理和社会秩序之间的另一个相似点也值得提及。二者本质上都是去中心化的。伦理立场并不试图去从上至下考量个体——以他们在上帝眼中的价值作为考量。不如说，它是一个对于每个人对他人所负义务的描述。而社会秩序，就其是演化来的而不是通过立法实现的而言，就是一套规则，其存在是因为遵循它们对一对对个体有利，而不是因为它们会提高社会总体福利。
IV: Conclusions
第四部分：结论
The central project of this essay has been to give an account of rights, especially property rights, that is both amoral and alegal—an account that would explain the sort of behavior we associate with rights even in a world lacking law, law enforcement, and feelings of moral obligation.
此文的中心目标，是提供一种关于权利，特别是关于财产权的非道德、非法律的解释——此种解释将能够说明我们那种与权利相伴随的行为，这种行为甚至存在于缺乏法律、执法机构和道德义务感的世界中。
I have tried first to explain how, with no legal system to enforce contracts, it might still be possible to contract out of a Hobbesian state of nature, and then to show how the same analysis can be used to understand in what sense a civil order, such as our own society, is different from a Hobbesian state of nature.
我首先试图解释，在没有法律系统强制执行契约的情况下，如何能够通过建立契约脱离霍布斯自然状态；其次说明了同一种分析如何能够用于理解（像我们社会这种）文明秩序和霍布斯自然状态有什么不同。
Having offered answers to those questions, I then tried to show how we might get from the state of nature to something like the present society, and to use the analysis to partially explain the puzzling similarity between actual rules, just rules, and efficient rules.
回答了这些问题之后，我接下来试图说明我们如何从自然状态到达类似现今社会的状态；继而用这种分析部分地解释了现实规则，正义规则和高效规则之间令人困惑的相似性。
If my analysis is correct, civil order is an elaborate Schelling point, maintained by the same forces that maintain simpler Schelling points in a state of nature. Property ownership is alterable by contract because Schelling points are altered by the making of contracts. Legal rules are in large part a superstructure erected upon an underlying structure of self-enforcing rights.
如果我的分析正确，文明秩序就是一个精巧的谢林点，被在自然状态中维持更为简单谢林点的同一种力量所维持。财产所有权能够通过契约改变，是因为建立契约的行为改变了谢林点。法律规则在很大程度上是一个上层结构（superstructure），建立在底层自我执行的权利结构之上。
翻译：思考一下名字
校对：小聂（@PuppetMaster），沈沉（@你在何地-sxy）
编辑：辉格@whigzhou