​​​The Only Thing, Historically, That’s Curbed Inequality: Catastrophe

历史上削弱不平等的唯一办法:灾难

Plagues, revolutions, massive wars, collapsed states—these are what reliably reduce economic disparities.
瘟疫,革命,大规模战争,国家崩溃——这些是能切实缩小财富差距的途径。


​Calls to make America great again hark back to a time when income inequality receded even as the economy boomed and the middle class expanded. Yet it is all too easy to forget just how deeply this newfound equality was rooted in the cataclysm of the world wars.

让美国再次伟大的号召让人回想起过去经济繁荣、中产阶级扩张、收入差异却能缩小的年代。然而,人们也非常容易忘记,这种新兴的平等是深深地根植于世界大战这一灾难。

The pressures of total war became a uniquely powerful catalyst of equalizing reform, spurring unionization, extensions of voting rights, and the creation of the welfare state. During and after wartime, aggressive government intervention in the private sector and disruptions to capital holdings wiped out upper-class wealth and funneled resources to workers; even in countries that escaped physical devastation and crippling inflation, marginal tax rates surged upward.

总体战带来的压力成为一项独特的强力催化剂,推动平等化改革、刺激工会发展、扩大投票权以及创建福利国家。战时以及战后,政府对私营部门的强烈干预和对资本持续保有的干扰卷走了上层人士的财富,将资源分配给劳动者。即使一些国家避开了大面积物质毁坏与严重通胀,它们的边际税率也急剧上升。

Concentrated for the most part between 1914 and 1945, this “Great Compression” (as economists call it) of inequality took several more decades to fully run its course across the developed world until the 1970s and 1980s, when it stalled and began to go into reverse.

主要发生于1914-1945年间的这种财富不平等的“大压缩”(经济学家如此命名),几十年间在发达国家充分展开,直到1970与1980年代才停住势头,并开始逆转。

This equalizing was a rare outcome in modern times but by no means unique over the long run of history. Inequality has been written into the DNA of civilization ever since humans first settled down to farm the land. Throughout history, only massive, violent shocks that upended the established order proved powerful enough to flatten disparities in income and wealth.

这种平等化现象在现代极少发生,但在长期历史中绝非个例。自人类第一次定居务农起,不平等就已被写入了文明的基因。纵观历史,只有当广泛而剧烈的冲击能够颠覆现有秩序,它才足以强大到抹平收入与财富的差距。

They appeared in four different guises: mass-mobilization warfare, violent and transformative revolutions, state collapse, and catastrophic epidemics. Hundreds of millions perished in their wake, and by the time these crises had passed, the gap between rich and poor had shrunk.

它们以四种不同的面貌出现:广泛动员的战争,剧烈变革的革命,国家崩溃与灾难性的传染病。上亿生命消逝其中,而当人们的哭嚎渐渐停止,富豪与穷人之间的差距也缩小了。

The first of these forces was very much a creature of the industrial age. Earlier wars had produced mixed results, as victors profited and losers paid. The Civil War is another example: It launched the careers of John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, and other Northern plutocrats, but ruined Southern slave-owners. Not since the times of the ancient Greeks had intense popular military mobilization (paired with egalitarian norms and institutions) helped curb economic inequality.

这四种力量中的第一种很大程度上是工业化时代的产物。早先的战争会造成双重效果,即胜者获益、败者买单。(美国)内战是另外一个例子:它使洛克菲勒、卡内基和其他的北方富豪开始了致富之路,但同时也毁掉了南方的奴隶主们。古希腊之后,高强度的群众军事动员(同时伴以平等主义的社会规范和制度)再也没能帮助削弱经济不平等(直到工业化时代的到来)。

Second are revolutions that truly transformed societies—the sort that were born of the two world wars. From 1917 on, communists in Russia, China, and elsewhere confiscated, redistributed and collectivized private wealth, and set wages, leveling inequality on an unprecedented scale. Revolutions before these, by contrast, were rarely extreme enough to have the same effect: The French Revolution, by comparison a far less bloody affair, made more modest headway.

第二种力量是那些真正重塑了社会的革命,就如两次世界大战带来的变革。自1917年起,俄罗斯、中国及其他各国的共产党没收了私人财产并将之再分配、公有化,同时设定工资率,以前所未有的力度调整财富不平等。与之相反,在此之前的革命远未剧烈到能取得相同效果:相比之下,法国大革命远未造成如此多的牺牲,在平等化方面取得的进展也更为温和。

Third, violent turmoil sometimes destroyed states altogether, taking the rich and powerful down with them. While everyone stood to suffer in times of collapse, the richest simply had more to lose.

第三种力量——剧烈的动乱——有时会彻底毁掉一个国家,同时也使权贵阶级跌落。在国家分崩离析的过程中,所有人都在忍受痛苦,而最富裕的那群人显然会失去更多。

Records of equalizing misery reach back thousands of years: The last Roman aristocrats lined up for handouts from the Pope, and Mayan nobility had to make do with the same diet as commoners. More recently, Somalia’s anarchy reduced the inequalities of the brutal kleptocracy that had preceded it.

有关那些带来平等化的苦难的记载可以追溯到几千年之前:末代罗马贵族们排队等候教皇的布施,而玛雅贵族们则不得不和平民一起勉强果腹。更近的例子有,索马里的无政府状态减弱了先前残暴的盗贼统治下的不平等。

Humans have long faced competition in inflicting damage serious enough to rebalance the scales, which brings up the fourth leveling force. The first pandemic of bubonic plague at the end of antiquity, the Black Death in the late Middle Ages, and the merciless onslaught of smallpox and measles that ravaged the New World after 1492 claimed so many lives that the price of labor soared and the value of land and other capital plummeted.

人类长期面临极具破坏性的天灾,严重到足以再平衡人口规模——这就是第四种力量。古代末期的第一次鼠疫大流行【译注:即查士丁尼瘟疫】、欧洲中世纪晚期的黑死病与1492年后无情地席卷新大陆的天花和麻疹带走了太多的人命,以至于劳动力价格猛增,土地和其他资产价格暴跌。

Workers ate and dressed better, while landlords were reduced to complaints that, as one English chronicler put it, “such a shortage of laborers ensued that the humble turned up their noses at employment, and could scarcely be persuaded to serve the eminent for triple wages.” Surviving tax registers from late medieval Italy also bear witness to the sweeping erosion of elite fortunes.

劳动者的吃穿状况得到改善,而地主被迫克制自己的不满,如一位英国编年史家所说,“(瘟疫之后)劳动力变得如此短缺以至于底层人民在雇佣市场上扬眉吐气,就算有三倍工资也不愿意为贵人服务。”意大利中世纪晚期,从瘟疫中逃过一劫的税务登记员也见证了精英财富的严重缩水。

But what of less murderous mechanisms of combating inequality? History offers little comfort. Land reform often foundered or was subverted by the propertied. Successful programs that managed to parcel out land to the poor and made sure they kept it owed much to the threat or exercise of violence, from Mexico during its revolution to postwar Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

那有没有致死率较低的对抗不平等的机制呢?历史没有给我们多少宽慰。土地改革总是失败或是被有产者破坏。而将土地分给贫困者并确保他们保有土地的成功改革都非常依赖暴力的威胁或实施,从革命时期的墨西哥到战后的日本、南韩和台湾,莫不如此。

Just as with the financial crisis of 2008, macroeconomic downturns rarely hurt the rich for more than a few years. Democracy on its own does not consistently lower inequality. And while improving access to education can indeed narrow income gaps, it is striking to see that American wage premiums for the credentialed collapsed precisely during both world wars.

就如2008年金融危机发生,宏观经济下行对富人们造成的损害也没有持续几年。民主本身并不会持久减少不平等。虽然提高受教育机会确实能够缩小收入差距,但让人吃惊的是,拥有职业资格证的美国人获得的工资溢价正好在两次世界大战期间剧烈下跌。

In the 1950s, the economist Simon Kuznets famously hypothesized that economic growth would be accompanied by a fairer distribution of resources, but this has mostly happened in the countries where such growth was shaped by the fallout from the world wars or fear of revolution.

1950年代,经济学家西蒙·库兹涅茨提出了一个著名的假设,预言经济增长将会伴随着更加公平的资源分配,但是事实上出现这种类型增长的国家大部分都是受到了世界大战或是革命恐慌的余波影响。

By contrast, Latin America, which sat out the 20th century’s largest conflicts in relative isolation, duly did not see inequality drop until the early 2000s—and by then it had scaled such heights that it could hardly have risen much further. Brazil and other countries targeted progressive policies toward the lowest-hanging fruit, but economic headwinds and political backlash cast doubt on the prospects of further peaceful leveling.

相反的,对20世纪最严重的冲突都相对置身事外的拉丁美洲,直到21世纪初才如期看到不平等状况的减弱——那时的不平等已经达到顶峰以至于不可能更进一步。巴西和其他国家将其进步主义政策的目标指向低垂之果【编注:指那些容易把握的增长机会】,但是经济逆行与政治反弹让人担心继续和平地调整不平等是否可能。

If history is any indication, then, the resurgence of inequality since the 1980s should not have come as a surprise. The effects of violent leveling invariably abate over time: Populations recover when plagues subside, failed states are replaced by newcomers.

如果历史果真有所启示,那么1980年代以来不平等势态的卷土重来就不会让人吃惊了。剧烈拉平的效果总是随着时间而减弱:疫情平稳之后人口开始恢复增长,新国家取代了旧的失败者。

By now the aftershocks of the 20th century’s great wars have faded. Top tax rates and union membership are down, communism is defunct, and globalization, however reviled, is (still) in full swing.

到目前为止,20世纪几次大战的余波已逐渐消失。高税率与工会势力渐渐式微,共产主义不复存在,全球化虽广受诋詈却仍然势头强劲。

The four levelling forces will not return any time soon: Technology has made mass warfare obsolete; violent, redistributive revolution has lost its appeal; most states are more resilient than they used to be; and advances in genetics will help humanity ward off novel germs.

在可见未来,这四种拉平差距的力量将不会再现:科技已经排除了全民战争的可能【编注:此处作者的意思是,高科技使得人力在战争中不再那么重要,因而无需大规模动员】;剧烈的、再分配的革命失去了吸引力;大多数国家的复原能力比过去更强;而遗传学的发展将会帮助人类免受新型病菌的侵害。

Even the most progressive welfare states of continental Europe are now struggling to compensate for the widening income disparities that exist before taxes and transfers. In the coming decades, the dramatic aging of rich countries and the pressures of immigration on social solidarity will make it ever harder to ensure a fairly equitable distribution of net incomes.

即使是欧洲大陆上最为进步主义的那些福利国家,如今也在艰难弥合税收和转移支付前不断扩大的收入差距。在接下来的几十年中,富国剧烈的老龄化和移民对社会稳固造成的压力将使净收入分配达到基本公平变得更难实现【编注:因为老龄化和移民让福利制度的成本大增】。

And on top of everything else, ongoing technological change might boost inequality in unpredictable ways, from more sophisticated automation that hollows out labor markets to genetic and cybernetic enhancements of the privileged human body.

同时,最为重要的是,正在发生的科技变革也许会以不可预料的方式加剧不平等,例如日渐精密的自动化抢占劳动力市场,运用遗传学与控制论手段增强权势个体的禀赋。

Greatness remains in the eye of the beholder: making America more equal again will prove the more daunting challenge. Whereas incremental policy measures to shore up the fortunes of the middle class are both desirable and feasible, the past suggests there is no plausible way to vote, regulate, or teach society back to the levels of equality enjoyed by the postwar generation.

伟不伟大不好说,不过让美国再次平等起来则是难上加难了。虽然越来越多的政策措施保障中产阶级的财富,这既顺应人心也是切实可行的,但历史告诉我们,再也没有办法通过投票、管制或教育让社会重现战后一代享受过的那种程度的平等了。

History cannot predict the future, but its message is as unpalatable as it is clear: With the rarest of exceptions, great reductions in inequality were only ever brought forth in sorrow.

历史不能预测未来,但是其教诲虽让人难以接受却是极其清楚的:除了极少例外,不平等的大幅度减弱都只能随不幸而来。


翻译:Eartha(@王小贰_Eartha)
校对:Drunkplane (@Drunkplane-zny)
编辑:辉格@whigzhou

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